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I. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly before the United States Congress enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
1
 (“Dodd-
Frank”), Senator Christopher Dodd, then-Chairman of the Senate 
Banking Committee, suggested that no one will know how the law will 
work until it becomes effective.
2
  The same might have been said al-
most ten years earlier about the  provisions with respect to security-
based swap agreements included in the Commodity Futures Modern-
ization Act of 2000
3
 (CFMA).  The CFMA defined the term “security-
based swap agreement” for purposes of, among other things, the 
general antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
4
 (the “Secu-
rities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
5
 (the “Exchange 
Act”).  Now, more than ten years after the CFMA was enacted, it re-
mains unclear what the term means and how far it extends. 
In a swap agreement, parties agree to exchange payments de-
termined with reference to a quantity of a specified asset.
6
  This quan-
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Elon University School of Law.  I would like to thank Steve 
Bradford, Tom Hazen, and Alan Palmiter for their helpful suggestions and com-
ments and Nathan Standley and Marie Anders for their research and editorial assis-
tance.  All errors and omissions, of course, are my own. 
 1 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code).  
 2 David Cho, Jia Lynn Yang & Brady Dennis, Lawmakers Guide Dodd-Frank Bill for 
Wall Street Reform into Homestretch, WASH. POST (June 26, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR20100 
62500675.html.  
 3 Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-365 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 
and 15 U.S. Code).  The CFMA was enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified in scattered 
sections of the U.S. Code).   
 4 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 5 Id. §§ 78a–78nn. 
 6 Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 
55 MD. L. REV. 1, 46 (1996). 
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tity is referred to as the “notional” amount, and the notional amount 
itself typically is not exchanged.
7
 
Swaps take many different forms, vary in complexity, and are 
used for different purposes.
8
  Perhaps the simplest form is an interest 
rate swap.  In an interest rate swap, the parties agree to exchange 
payments calculated by multiplying interest rates by a notional 
amount equal to an amount of money. 
Borrowers often use interest rate swaps to hedge against the risk 
of changes in interest rates.
9
  For example, a borrower who is obligat-
ed on a $1 million loan that bears interest at a variable rate per an-
num equal to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
10
 is sub-
ject to changes in LIBOR.  If LIBOR averages four percent during a 
year, the borrower’s annual financing cost is $40,000.  If LIBOR aver-
ages eight percent, the borrower pays $80,000.  To eliminate the risk 
of changes in LIBOR, the borrower might enter into a floating-to-
fixed interest rate swap.  Under the swap, the borrower would agree 
to make periodic payments determined by multiplying a “fixed rate” 
of, perhaps, six percent per annum by a notional amount equal to $1 
million, the outstanding principal under the loan.  In exchange, the 
other party—known as the counterparty—would agree to make peri-
odic payments determined by multiplying a “floating rate” of LIBOR 
by the notional amount.
11
  By entering into the swap, the borrower 
fixes its annual net financing cost at $60,000.  If LIBOR averages four 
percent during a year, the borrower’s net financing cost is $60,000.
12
  
 
 7 Id. 
 8 See PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 
§ 1.02[8], at 56 (2004) (indicating that swaps generally are used to hedge risks, but 
also may be used for “purely speculative purposes”). 
 9 See id. (noting that swaps are used as hedges against “the risk of adverse chang-
es in interest rates”). 
 10 The London InterBank Offered Rate  
is produced for ten currencies with 15 maturities quoted for each—
ranging from overnight to 12 months—thus producing 150 rates each 
business day.  [LIBOR] is a benchmark giving an indication of the av-
erage rate at which a leading bank can obtain unsecured funding . . . 
for a given period, in a given currency.   
The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://bbalibor.bladonmore.com/bbalibor-explained/the-
basics (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).     
 11 Typically, the periodic payments are netted against each other, with the party 
owing the higher amount paying the other party the difference between the two 
amounts. 
 12 The borrower’s total payments would be $100,000—$40,000 in interest to the 
lender and a $60,000 fixed rate payment to the swap counterparty.  Offsetting those 
payments would be a $40,000 floating rate payment from the counterparty.   
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If LIBOR averages eight percent, the borrower’s net financing cost is 
the same.
13
 
A swap is a type of derivative, which means that it derives its val-
ue from some other asset.
14
  Before the CFMA was enacted, the extent 
to which swaps and other derivatives were subject to federal securities 
laws was uncertain.  The CFMA attempted to eliminate this uncer-
tainty with respect to certain over-the-counter derivatives
15
—those 
that are both between sophisticated parties and subject to individual 
negotiation—by excluding them from the definition of “security” for 
purposes of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and thereby 
making the onerous registration and information reporting require-
ments of those laws inapplicable to them.
16
  At the same time, howev-
er, the CFMA made a specific type or category of over-the-counter de-
rivatives—security-based swap agreements—subject to existing 
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
17
 
The CFMA defined the term “security-based swap agreement” as 
“a swap agreement . . . of which a material term is based on the price, 
yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index of secu-
rities, or any interest therein.”
18
  Since the CFMA was enacted, very 
few courts have interpreted the term, and it was not until 2008 that 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought its first anti-
fraud enforcement action with respect to a security-based swap 
agreement.
19
  In SEC v. Langford, the SEC alleged that the former 
 
 13 The borrower’s total payments would be $140,000—$80,000 in interest to the 
lender and a $60,000 fixed rate payment to the swap counterparty.  Offsetting those 
payments would be an $80,000 floating rate payment from the counterparty. 
 14 See Romano, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that a derivative’s value is based on an-
other asset); Over-The-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency 
and Reduce Risks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 45 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Schapiro Testimony] (statement of Hon. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts062209mls.htm (indicating that a de-
rivative is based on the value of a “reference” asset or event). 
 15 An over-the-counter derivative is one that “is not traded on a regulated ex-
change.”  Schapiro Testimony, supra note 14, at 45. 
 16 CFMA, Pub. L. 106-554, §§ 302(a), 303(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-451 to 2763A-
453 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1 (2006)). 
 17 Id. §§ 302(b), 303(d), 114 Stat. at 2763A-452, 2763A-454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (2006)). 
 18 Id. § 301(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-451 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c note) (adding 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act section 206B), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1759 (2010)). 
 19 Litigation Release No. 20545, 2008 WL 1902075 (Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter 
Langford Release] (describing the initiation of the Langford enforcement action).  
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president of the Jefferson County, Alabama, commission and two of 
his friends, one a broker-dealer and one a lobbyist, violated Securities 
Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in 
connection with interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $3.5 bil-
lion in total) entered into with respect to various series of bonds is-
sued by Jefferson County.
20
  In 2009, the SEC brought a related en-
forcement action against two managing directors of J.P. Morgan 
Securities, Inc.  In SEC v. LeCroy, the SEC alleged that the J.P. Morgan 
managing directors violated Securities Act section 17(a) and Ex-
change Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to three of the 
Jefferson County interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $2 bil-
lion in total) at issue in Langford.
21
  Langford and LeCroy bring to the 
fore the question of how far the term “security-based swap agree-
ment” extends and, more specifically, whether it is so broad that it 
may include a simple interest rate swap. 
The over-the-counter derivatives market is enormous.  Since De-
cember 2008, the market value of over-the-counter derivative con-
tracts has exceeded $20 trillion.22  During that time, the market value 
of interest rate swaps alone has exceeded $12.5 trillion.
23
  Enacted in 
response to the financial crisis that began at the end of the last dec-
ade, Dodd-Frank brings sweeping regulation to this huge segment of 
the economy that the CFMA largely left unregulated.  The reform Act 
divides the over-the-counter derivatives market into two segments, 
putting the SEC in charge of one and the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) in charge of the other.
24
  The category over 
which the CFTC has general jurisdiction includes security-based swap 
agreements, though the term is more narrowly defined.  The SEC, 
however, continues to have the same antifraud jurisdiction over secu-
rity-based swap agreements that it had previously.
25
  Therefore, the in-
terpretation of the term remains important in defining the reach of 
the federal securities antifraud provisions. 
 
 20 Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, 11–12, SEC v. Langford, No. CV-08-B-0761-S (N.D. Ala. Apr. 
30, 2008) [hereinafter Langford Complaint], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20545.pdf. 
 21 Complaint ¶¶ 1—14, SEC v. LeCroy, No. CV-09-B-2238-S (N.D. Ala. Nov. 4, 
2009) [hereinafter LeCroy Complaint], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21280.pdf. 
 22 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, JUNE 2011 app. at A131 
tbl.19 (2011) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review).   
 23 Id. 
 24 See infra Part IV (describing the jurisdiction of the SEC and the CFTC under 
Dodd-Frank). 
 25 See infra Part IV (discussing the effect of Dodd-Frank).   
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This Article examines the historical interpretation of the term 
“security-based swap agreement,” its application in Langford and 
LeCroy, and the continuing viability of applying  antifraud provisions 
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to security-based swap 
agreements post-Dodd-Frank.  It concludes that Congress should 
eliminate application of antifraud provisions in the federal securities 
laws to security-based swap agreements because continued applica-
tion is unnecessary and undesirable after Dodd-Frank. 
Part II of this Article discusses the extent to which the securities 
laws applied to swaps prior to Dodd-Frank and includes a review and 
critique of the handful of opinions that have considered the scope of 
the term “security-based swap agreement” as defined before Dodd-
Frank.  Part III considers whether the interest rate swaps at issue in 
Langford and LeCroy were security-based swap agreements under the 
pre-Dodd-Frank definition.  It offers a reasonable argument that they 
were based on the statutory text, but suggests that such a result makes 
little sense from a policy perspective.  Part IV describes generally the 
jurisdictional division between the SEC and the CFTC under Dodd-
Frank and how security-based swap agreements fit within the new re-
gime.  Part V explores reasons to do away with the “security-based 
swap agreement” concept in the federal securities laws while consid-
ering the possible benefits of retaining it.  Finally, Part VI concludes 
that Congress should eliminate the “security-based swap agreement” 
concept from the Securities Act and the Exchange Act because the 
applicable provisions went largely unused pre-Dodd-Frank and likely 
will be even more inconsequential post-reform, an appropriate allo-
cation of securities antifraud jurisdiction can be achieved without the 
term, the term has been poorly interpreted and is overly broad, and 
the term results in redundancy and confusion in the new regulatory 
scheme. 
II. TREATMENT OF SWAPS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS PRIOR TO 
DODD-FRANK 
A. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act are two of the primary antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws.  Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under section 10(b) in 
1942 and, since then, has served as a “powerful antifraud weapon.”
26
  
Securities Act section 17(a) prohibits fraud “in the offer or sale of any 
 
 26 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[2], at 442 
(2009). 
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securities,”
27
 and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit 
fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
28
  Prior 
to the CFMA, if a transaction did not involve a security, it was not sub-
ject to section 17(a), section 10(b), or Rule 10b-5. 
Until the CFMA was enacted, whether a swap could be a security 
was an open question.  A single 1996 opinion by the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had concluded that 
two specific interest rate swaps were not securities,
29
 but not surpris-
 
 27 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 28 Id. § 78j(b) (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2011) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 29 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1283 (S.D. 
Ohio 1996).  Both swaps at issue in Proctor & Gamble were leveraged interest rate 
swaps.  Under one of the swaps, which the district court referred to as the “5s/30s 
swap,” Bankers Trust agreed to pay a fixed rate equal to 5.30%, and in return, Proc-
tor & Gamble agreed to pay a floating rate equal to the prevailing commercial paper 
rate minus seventy-five basis points plus, after the first six months, a spread deter-
mined in reference to the yields and prices of certain treasury securities.  Id. at 1276.  
In concluding that the 5s/30s swap was not a security under the Securities Act or the 
Exchange Act, the court specifically determined that it (i) was not an investment 
contract because it did not involve a “common enterprise” or the entrepreneurial 
efforts of others as required by SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), and was not an 
“instrument commonly known as a security” for the same reasons; (ii) was not a note 
or evidence of indebtedness because there was no exchange of principal and the 
facts with respect to the swap did not meet the requirements of the “family resem-
blance” test set out by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 
(1990); and (iii) was not an option because, even though it was based on a security, it 
did not give either party the right to take possession of a security.  Proctor & Gamble, 
925 F. Supp. at 1278–80, 1282–83, 1293. 
     In reaching its decision, the Proctor & Gamble court noted that it was not bound by 
the SEC’s decision in two related administrative proceedings that a “Treasury-Linked 
Swap,” a swap quite similar to the 5s/30s swap in Proctor & Gamble, was a security.  Id. 
at 1281 (citing In re Vazquez, Securities Act Release No. 33-7269, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-36906, 1996 WL 86528 (Feb. 29, 1996); In re BT Sec. Corp., Securities 
Act Release No. 33-7124, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35136, 1994 WL 710743 (Dec. 
22, 1994)).  In BT Securities and Vazquez, the SEC observed that the “Treasury-Linked 
Swap” was not truly a swap, but in substance was a cash-settled option based on the 
price and yields of treasury securities.  Vazquez, 1996 WL 86528, at *4 n.4; BT Securi-
ties, 1994 WL 710743, at *9 n.6.  According to the SEC, as an option based on securi-
ties, the swap was also a security.  BT Securities, 1994 WL 710743, at *9 n. 6.  
     In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that 
Proctor & Gamble was incorrect in finding that, for an option to be a security, the in-
strument must contain a right to exercise and take possession of a security.  Caiola v. 
Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 326 (2d Cir. 2002).   To the contrary, the Second Cir-
cuit observed that the definition of “security” under the Exchange Act includes a 
cash-settled option on a security.  Id. at 325.  The Caiola opinion, which determined 
that a cash-settled option on a security is itself a security, does not necessarily indicate 
that the 5s/30s swap in Proctor & Gamble was also a security.  The Second Circuit in 
Caiola observed that the definition of “security” in Exchange Act section 3(a)(10) 
does not “distinguish between options documented as swaps as opposed to options 
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ingly, that decision alone could not quell the uncertainty surround-
ing the treatment of swaps under the federal securities laws.  Viewing 
the uncertainty as detrimental to the marketplace,
30
 Congress enacted 
the CFMA in 2000. 
The CFMA resolved the uncertainty through amendments to the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
31
 (GLBA), the Securities Act, and the Ex-
change Act.  The CFMA amended the GLBA to add section 206A, 
which defined the term “swap agreement” broadly to include, among 
other things, 
any agreement, contract, or transaction between eligible contract 
participants . . . , the material terms of which (other than price 
and quantity) are subject to individual negotiation, and that . . . 
provides on an executory basis for the exchange, on a fixed or 
contingent basis, of one or more payments based on the value or 
level of one or more interest or other rates, currencies, commodi-
ties, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative 
measures, or other financial or economic interests or property of 
any kind, or any interest therein or based on the value thereof, 
and that transfers, as between the parties to the transaction, in 
whole or in part, the financial risk associated with a future change 
in any such value or level without also conveying a current or fu-
ture direct or indirect ownership interest in an asset . . . or liability 
that incorporates the financial risk so transferred, including any 
such agreement, contract, or transaction commonly known as an 
interest rate swap, including a rate floor, rate cap, rate collar, 
cross-currency rate swap, basis swap, currency swap, equity index 
swap, equity swap, debt index swap, debt swap, credit spread, 
 
documented in some other fashion,” but indicated that it was not addressing whether 
an “interest rate swap” with “option-like features” is a security.  Id. at 326. 
 30 One of the goals of the CFMA was to provide certainty that swap agreements 
generally were not subject to securities laws or commodities laws.  See CFMA, Pub. L. 
No. 106-554, § 2(6), 114 Stat. 2763A-365, 2763A-366 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 note 
(2006)) (stating that one of the purposes of the Act was the “reduc[tion of] systemic 
risk by enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain futures and derivatives 
transactions”); see also 146 CONG. REC. 27,176 (2000) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (“It 
is important to note that nothing in the title should be read to imply that swap 
agreements are either securities or futures contracts.”); 146 CONG. REC. 27,077 
(2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (“[One of t]he fundamental purposes of [the 
CFMA is] . . . to provide legal certainty for the over-the counter derivatives market.”).  
Congress placed the definition of “swap agreement” in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
because it is “a neutral statute . . . that is not specifically part of a banking, securities, 
or commodities law.”  146 CONG. REC. 27, 176 (2000) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
 31 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006).  
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credit default swap, credit swap, weather swap, or commodity 
swap . . . .
32
 
The CFMA then divided swap agreements into two types—“security-
based swap agreements” and “non-security-based swap agreements”—
through the addition of sections 206B and 206C to the GLBA.  The 
term “security-based swap agreement” was defined as “a swap agree-
ment . . . of which a material term is based on the price, yield, value, 
or volatility of any security or any group or index of securities, or any 
interest therein;”
33
 the term “non-security-based swap agreement” 
meant everything else.
34
  Finally, the CFMA added Section 2A to the 
Securities Act and section 3A to the Exchange Act, both of which 
provided that the definition of “security” included neither type of 
swap agreement.
35
 
The combined effect of the CFMA amendments to the GLBA, 
the Securities Act, and the Exchange Act was to remove all swap 
agreements from the registration and reporting requirements of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
36
  The CFMA, however, did not 
 
 32 CFMA § 301(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-449 to 2763A-450 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78c note (2006)) (adding Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act section 206A).  The CFMA 
housed the definition of “eligible contract participant” in section 1a(12) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act.  Id. § 101, 114 Stat. at 2763A-368 to 2763A-371 (codified 
at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12) (2006)).  Under Section 1a(12), eligible contract participants 
include sophisticated persons and entities such as financial institutions; regulated 
insurance companies; regulated investment companies; certain commodity pools; 
corporations, partnerships, proprietorships, organizations, trusts, and other entities 
that have a minimum of total assets; certain employee benefit plans; governmental 
entities and political subdivisions, instrumentalities, agencies, and departments 
thereof that own and invest on a discretionary basis a minimum amount of invest-
ments; certain brokers and dealers; and individuals with a minimum of total assets.  
Id. 
 33 CFMA § 301(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-451 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c note 
(2006)) (adding Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act section 206B), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. at 1376, 1759 (2010).  
 34 See id. (adding Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206C), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act § 
762(a), 124 Stat. at 1376, 1759 (“[T]he term ‘nonsecurity-based swap agreement’ 
means any swap agreement . . . that is not a security-based swap agreement.”).   
 35 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he definition of ‘security’. . . does not 
include any security-based swap agreement.”); id. § 78c-1(b)(1) (same); id. § 77b-
1(b)(1) ( “[T]he definition of ‘security’ . . . does not include any non-security-based 
swap agreement”); id. § 78c-1(a) (same). 
 36 The CFMA amendments to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act did not 
necessarily establish that all swaps were not securities.  The definition of “swap 
agreement” in GLBA section 206A includes several exceptions.  See Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act § 206A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006) (listing exclusions from the term 
“swap agreement”).  Moreover, if a party to a swap was not an eligible contract partic-
ipant or the material terms were not subject to individual negotiation, the swap was 
not considered a swap agreement under GLBA, and therefore Securities Act section 
2A and Exchange Act section 3A would not exclude the swap from the definition of se-
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exclude swap agreements so broadly from the reach of the antifraud 
provisions of those laws.  Although Securities Act §§ 2A(b)(2) and (3) 
and Exchange Act §§ 3A(b)(2) and (3) generally prohibited the SEC 
from taking “prophylactic measures against fraud, manipulation, or 
insider trading with respect to any security-based swap agreements,” 
the CFMA amended the antifraud provisions in section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to include secu-
rity-based swap agreements within their scope.
37
 
B. Opinions Addressing Security-Based Swap Agreements 
The pre-Dodd-Frank definition of “security-based swap agree-
ment” consists of five components.
38
  For an agreement, contract, or 
transaction to be a security-based swap agreement: 
• the agreement, contract, or transaction must be a swap 
agreement; 
• the swap agreement must have a term that relates to a 
price, yield, value, or volatility; 
• the term must be based on the price, yield, value, or vola-
tility; 
• the price, yield, value, or volatility must be of a security, a 
group or index of securities, or an interest in a security or group 
or index of securities; and 
• the term must be material.39 
 
curity under Securities Act section 2(a)(1) and Exchange Act section 3(a)(10).  See  § 
206A(a). 
 37 CFMA §§ 302(b), 303(d), 114 Stat. at 2763A-452, 2763A-454 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j (2006)).  The CFMA also made security-based swap agreements 
subject to the antimanipulation provisions of the Exchange Act sections 9(a), 
15(c)(1), 16(a) and (b), 20(d), and 21A(a)(1).  Id. § 303(b)–(c), (e)–(k), 114 Stat. at 
2763A-453 to 2763A-454, 2763A-454 to 2763A-456 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78o, 
78p, 78t, 78u-1 (2006)).  It amended Exchange Act section 10(b) to provide that se-
curity-based swap agreements were subject to rules under section 10(b) , including 
Rule 10b-5, and to judicial precedents under Securities Act section 17(a) and Ex-
change Act sections 9(a), 10(b), 15(c)(1), 16(a) and (b), 20(d), and 21A(a)(1).  Id. 
§ 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006)).  No specific amendment to the text of 
Rule 10b-5 therefore was required, and the SEC, accordingly, has never amended 
Rule 10b-5 to reference security-based swap agreements.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2012). 
 38 The post-Dodd-Frank definition includes the same five components, but ex-
cludes any “security-based swap” from the definition.  See infra notes 199–202 and ac-
companying text (describing how Dodd-Frank amended the definition of “security-
based swap agreement”).  The term “security-based swap” is a new term added by 
Dodd-Frank.  See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the term “securi-
ty-based swap”). 
MOLONY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  12:32 PM 
962 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:953 
Since the CFMA was enacted, very few opinions have been issued 
in cases involving swaps described as security-based swap agreements 
and only one of those opinions— the 2010 opinion of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in SEC v. 
Rorech
40
—has given studied attention to the definition of the term.  
Rorech offered important guidance as to two components of the defi-
nition—when a term is based on price, yield, value, or volatility and 
when a term is material.   
Unfortunately, opinions in other cases involving security-based 
swap agreements have done little to develop the contours of the defi-
nition.  These other opinions fit into one of two categories.  In one 
category are the opinions in St. Matthew’s Baptist Church v. Wachovia 
Bank, National Ass’n
41
 and School District of the City of Erie v. J.P. Morgan 
Chase Bank,
42
 which summarily excluded LIBOR-based interest rate 
swaps from the definition merely because LIBOR is not determined 
in reference to any security.  In the other category are the opinions in 
Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., which merely made conclusory statements 
that the swaps at issue were security-based swap agreements,
43
 and the 
opinions in Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE,
44
 SEC v. Wyly,
45
 
and SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
46
 which did not address whether the 
swaps involved met the definition.
47
 
1. Rorech 
In Rorech, the SEC alleged that Jon-Paul Rorech and Renato 
Negrin had engaged in illegal insider trading with respect to two 
credit default swaps (CDSs).
48
  Each of the CDSs
49
 referenced VNU 
 
 39 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206B, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006), repealed by 
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. at 1376, 1759 (2010) 
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c note) (defining the term “security-based swap agree-
ment”).  
 40 720 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 41 No. Civ.A. 04-4540(FLW), 2005 WL 1199045 (D.N.J. May 18, 2005). 
 42 No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV 07982, 2009 WL 234128 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009). 
 43 295 F.3d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 2002); Caiola v. Citibank, N.A, 137 F. Supp. 2d 362 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d 295 F.3d 312. 
 44 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (2010). 
 45 No. 10 Civ. 5760 (SAS), 2011 WL 1226381 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011). 
 46 No. 10 Civ. 3229(BSJ)(MHD), 2011 WL 2305988 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011). 
 47 The opinions that have been issued in LeCroy and Langford, likewise, do not 
address whether the swaps at issue meet the definition of “security-based swap 
agreement.”  Those opinions are described in Part III infra. 
 48 SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 49 The District Court in Rorech explained how a typical CDS works: 
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N.V., a Dutch company, and a particular VNU bond.
50
  Each also had 
a notional amount of $10 million and required the buyer to pay a 
price, or “spread,” of 383 basis points (3.83 %) on a quarterly basis.
51
  
The swaps further provided that, upon the occurrence of certain 
credit events with respect to VNU, the swap seller would pay the no-
tional amount to the swap buyer and the swap buyer would deliver 
the referenced VNU bond to the swap seller.
52
 
The SEC argued that the CDSs were security-based swap agree-
ments subject to the antifraud provisions of Exchange Act section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because their price was based on the price, 
yield, value, or volatility of VNU bonds, which were securities.
53
  The 
defendants, though willing to acknowledge that the price of the swaps 
might be related to the price, yield, value, or volatility of the VNU 
bonds, denied that the price was based on the price, yield, value or 
volatility of the VNU bonds.
54
  The defendants argued that the term 
“based on” requires a “direct, or exclusive dependence” and that fac-
tors unrelated to the VNU bonds were incorporated in pricing the 
swaps—factors such as general market conditions and the market’s 
determination of the risk that VNU would not meet its obligations.
55
  
The defendants also argued that the material terms of the CDSs were 
not “based on” the price, yield, value, or volatility of the VNU bonds 
because the swap contracts themselves did not “explicitly refer to the 
 
While there are different types of CDSs, the CDSs that are at issue in 
this case are contracts that provide protection against the credit risk of 
a particular company.  The seller of a CDS agrees to pay the buyer a 
specific sum of money, called the notional amount, if a credit event, 
such as bankruptcy, occurs in the referenced company.  If a credit 
event occurs, the buyer generally must provide to the seller any of cer-
tain debt instruments that are deliverable pursuant to the CDS con-
tract.   In exchange for this risk protection from the CDS-seller, the 
CDS-buyer agrees to make periodic premium payments during the 
course of the contract.  The CDS-buyer can use the CDS to provide 
protection, like insurance, against the possibility that the debt instru-
ments the buyer holds will seriously deteriorate in value because of a 
credit event in the referenced company.  The CDS-buyer could also 
buy the CDS without owning the underlying referenced security, a “na-
ked CDS,” in the expectation that it would increase in value based on 
any one of a number of factors including the likelihood that a credit 
event will occur in the referenced company.  
Id. at 370–71. 
 50 Id. at 371, 387.  
 51 Id. at 387. 
 52 Id. at 370–71, 387.   
 53 Id. at 405.  
 54 Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 405 
 55 Id. at 405. 
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price or value of any security.”
56
  The defendants observed that the 
price of each CDS was simply stated in basis points.
57
 
Although the district court ultimately entered judgment in favor 
of the defendants because the SEC failed to offer sufficient evidence 
to support insider trading,
58
 the court agreed with the SEC that the 
swaps were security-based swap agreements.
59
  The court concluded 
that, to be “based on” the price, yield, value, or volatility of the VNU 
bonds, the price of the VNU swaps need not have been exclusively 
connected to one of those elements.
60
  Noting that the GLBA did not 
define the term “based on,” the court applied the ordinary meaning 
of the term, stating that “it means to use as the fundamental part or 
ingredient of, or principal component of, something.”
61
  According to 
the court, applying the ordinary meaning was appropriate in light of 
the term’s context within the GLBA and its place within the securities 
antifraud regime.
62
  The court asserted, moreover, that the legislative 
history of the GLBA indicated that Congress intended to sweep 
broadly to bring “novel financial instruments” within the scope of the 
Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions and that requiring an explicit 
reference to a security in a swap agreement would be inconsistent 
with that intent.
63
 
Looking to the ordinary meaning of “based on,” the district 
court concluded that the CDSs at issue in the case were security-based 
swap agreements for two reasons.  First, the spread (or yield), price, 
and value of VNU bonds deliverable under the CDSs were a “funda-
mental” consideration of the buyer in evaluating the price to pay for 
the swaps.
64
  Second, the documents governing each CDS included a 
provision under which cash settlement of the swap was to be calculat-
ed using the price of VNU obligations deliverable under the swap.
65
  
The court determined that this provision was material because the 
amount to be delivered at settlement “was plainly part of, if not all of, 
 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. at 415–17.  
 59 Id. at 408.  
 60 Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 405.  
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 406.  
 63 Id. at 406–07.  
 64 Id. at 407.  
 65 Id. at 408.  
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the consideration for which the CDS-buyer agreed to make premium 
payments.”
66
 
Rorech provides valuable guidance as to how to determine 
whether a term is material and what it means for a term to be based on 
price, yield, value, or volatility.  Regarding materiality, Rorech simply 
indicates that “[t]he material terms of a contract are those that must 
be sufficiently definite to allow the contract to be enforceable.  Ex-
amples . . . include subject matter, price, payment terms, quantity, 
timing, compensation, and duration.”
67
  With respect to the meaning 
of “based on,” Rorech makes two significant points.  First, for a term to 
be “based on”  price, yield, value, or volatility means only that the 
price, yield, value, or volatility must be a principal or fundamental 
part of the term.
68
  A direct or exclusive relationship is not required.
69
  
Second, a swap agreement itself need not specifically reference price, 
yield, value, or volatility.  It is sufficient that price, yield, value, or vol-
atility be used in evaluating the relevant term.
70
 
Rorech’s parameters for the term “based on” are reasonable in 
light of the legislative history of the CFMA.  As the opinion noted, the 
legislative history, albeit slim,
71
 suggests that Congress intended the 
term “security-based swap agreement” to be flexible enough to ad-
dress new types of instruments.
72
  A narrow interpretation of “based 
on” would deprive it of that flexibility. 
 
 66 Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id. at 407.   
 69 See id. at 407 (noting that requiring “a direct, explicit relationship . . . would 
allow traders to escape the ambit of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through clever 
drafting”).  
 70 See id. at 407 (noting that, in deciding whether to purchase the CDSs at issue in 
Rorech, the swap buyer considered the yield, price, and value of the referenced 
bonds).   
 71 Caiola v. Citibank, N.A. 137 F. Supp. 2d 362, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The legisla-
tive history of the CFMA concerning security-based swap agreements is sparse . . . .”). 
 72 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 27,309 (2000) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (“Title III 
[of the CFMA] applies anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the Federal 
securities laws to securities-based swap agreements . . . .  This will enhance protection 
for investors and for the financial markets, and will permit the SEC to respond as 
necessary to developments in these markets.”); 146 CONG. REC. 27,078 (2000) (state-
ment of Rep. Dingell) (“One of the most important provisions of the [CFMA] . . . 
gives the SEC antifraud authority over securities-based swap agreements . . . .  This 
permits the SEC to use its tested methods to enhance the protection in [the swap] 
markets and to respond as necessary to developments in the future.”);  see also Rorech, 
720 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (“Administration officials and congressional members ex-
pressed support for making it clear that the SEC’s traditional anti-fraud and insider 
trading enforcement authority applied to novel financial instruments.”). 
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Although Rorech’s ultimate explanation of the meaning of “based 
on” seems correct, the court’s discussion of how the GLBA statutory 
scheme supports its conclusion that the CDSs at issue in the case met 
the “based on” requirement is peculiar.  In reaching its conclusion, 
the court reasoned that Congress must have intended the CDSs at is-
sue in the case to be subject to Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 because Congress had included in the broad definition of 
“swap agreement” both interest rate swaps, “which clearly are not ‘se-
curity based swap agreements,’” and CDSs.
73
  For that and other rea-
sons, according to the court, it was appropriate to conclude that the 
CDSs at issue were “based on” the price, yield, value, or volatility of 
the VNU bonds and therefore were security-based swap agreements.
74
 
The court’s statement that interest rate swaps “clearly” are not 
security-based swap agreements suggests that the court blindly fol-
lowed, and extended to all interest rate swaps, the conclusion 
reached in both St. Matthew’s and School District of Erie that LIBOR-
based interest rate swaps are not security-based swap agreements.
75
  A 
plain interpretation of the GLBA belies the clarity that Rorech de-
clared.  Under GLBA section 206A, the definition of “swap agree-
ment” includes interest rate swaps.
76
  The definition of “security-based 
swap agreement” in GLBA section 206B simply is “a swap agreement 
(as defined in section 206A of [GLBA]) of which a material term is 
based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any 
group of index of securities, or any interest therein.”
77
  Taking these 
two definitions together, then, an interest rate swap “of which a mate-
rial term is based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security 
or any group of index of securities, or any interest therein” is a secu-
rity-based swap agreement.  If Congress had intended to exclude in-
terest rate swaps from the definition, it could have done so explicitly 
in the definition of “security-based swap agreement.”  Congress did 
not. 
 
 73 Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
 74 See id. at 408. 
 75 See id. at 406 (citing Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 
07688, 08 CV 07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009); St. Matthew’s 
Baptist Church v. Wachovia Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. Civ.A. 04-4540(FLW), 2005 WL 
1199045, at *12–13 (D.N.J. May 18, 2005)).   
 76 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006). 
 77 Id. § 206B, repealed by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1759 (2010).  
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2. St. Matthew’s and School District of Erie 
About five years before Rorech, the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey in St. Matthew’s Baptist Church v. Wa-
chovia Bank National Ass’n considered the substance of the term “se-
curity-based swap agreement” in connection with a private cause of 
action under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
78
  St. Mat-
thew’s Baptist Church alleged that Wachovia had violated Exchange 
Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to a floating-to-fixed 
interest rate swap the church had entered into with Wachovia.
79
  The 
church had obtained an approximately $5 million loan from Wa-
chovia and delivered to Wachovia a note under which the church 
agreed to pay interest at a rate equal to one-month LIBOR plus 
1.50%.
80
  Approximately two months before, in anticipation of the 
loan, the parties had entered into an interest rate swap with a notion-
al amount equal to the principal amount of the loan. 
81
  Under the 
swap, the church agreed to make payments to Wachovia based on a 
fixed rate equal to 9.13%, and Wachovia agreed to make payments to 
the church based on a floating rate equal to LIBOR plus 1.50%.
82
 
The church argued that the swap was a security-based swap 
agreement subject to the antifraud provisions of Exchange Act sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the floating rate under the swap 
was based on LIBOR.
83
  The district court disagreed, taking judicial 
notice of the British Bankers’ Association’s explanation that LIBOR is 
an interest rate and concluding “therefore [that LIBOR is] not an in-
dex based on the ‘price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or 
 
 78 St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045  (D.N.J. May 18, 2005).  Although Exchange 
Act section 10(b) does not expressly provide for a private cause of action and noth-
ing indicates that Congress intended a private cause of action, the United States Su-
preme Court, following a long line of cases from the lower courts, determined that a 
private cause of action indeed exists.  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975).  The general consensus is that no similar private cause of 
action exists under Securities Act section 17(a).  See, e.g., Koehler v. Bank of Berm. 
(N.Y.) Ltd., 209 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 
F.2d 169, 174–75 (2d Cir. 1992) (indicating that no private right of action exists un-
der section 17(a))); Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In re-
cent years, every circuit to have addressed the issue has refused to recognize a private 
right of action . . . .”).  
 79 St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045, at *2. 
 80 Id.  The opinion incorrectly states that the interest rate on the note was one-
month LIBOR plus 150%.  Id.  The actual rate was one-month LIBOR plus 150 basis 
points or 1.5%.  Complaint at 25, St. Matthew’s Baptist Church v. Wachovia Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n, No. Civ.A. 04-4540(FLW),(D.N.J. May 18, 2005). 
 81 St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045, at *1. 
 82 Id.  
 83 Id. at *13.  
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any group or index of securities.’”
84
  As a result, according to the 
court, the swap was not a security-based swap agreement.
85
 
The court in St. Matthew’s reached the right result, but not nec-
essarily for the right reason.  The definition of swap agreement in 
GLBA section 206A specifically includes interest rate swaps.
86
  For a 
floating-to-fixed interest rate swap, both the floating rate and the 
fixed rate are material because each rate represents the “price” paid to 
receive the other rate.
87
  The floating rate under the swap at issue in 
St. Matthew’s, LIBOR plus 1.50%, was the very same rate as the inter-
est rate in the note; therefore, one easily could conclude that the 
floating swap rate was based on the interest rate in the note.  The in-
terest rate on the note was more than a fundamental part of deter-
mining the floating rate—it was the floating rate. 
The St. Matthew’s court incorrectly suggested that the relevant 
question in the case was whether LIBOR was an index based on “the 
price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index 
of securities.”  The definition of security-based swap agreement, how-
ever, requires that a material term of the swap agreement be based on 
“the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or in-
dex of securities or any interest therein.”  Because the floating and 
fixed rates under the swap were material terms and because the float-
ing rate was based on the interest rate under the note, the questions 
that the court should have asked were whether the note was a security 
and whether the identity of the floating rate and the variable interest 
rate meant that either the floating rate or the fixed rate was based on 
the price, yield, value or volatility of an interest in the note.  In St. 
Matthew’s, the former question was an easy one.  The note was not a 
security under Reves v. Ernst & Young,
88
 and for that reason alone, the 
 
 84 Id.  
 85 See id. (dismissing the federal securities claims).   
 86 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006). 
 87 See SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The material 
terms of a contract are those terms that must be sufficiently definite to allow the con-
tract to be enforceable.  Examples . . . include subject matter, price, payment terms, 
quantity, timing, compensation, and duration.”).  
 88 494 U.S. 56 (1990).  Although Securities Act section 2(a)(1) and Exchange Act 
section 3(a)(10) both include “note” in the definition of “security,” the United States 
Supreme Court has determined that not all notes are securities.  Id. at 63.  The note 
in St. Matthew’s was issued to refinance a short-term loan for the construction of 
church facilities.  St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045, at *1.  Under Reves, the St. Mat-
thew’s note would not be a security because it was issued for construction with respect 
to a church, it was not distributed, the investing public would not expect a note by a 
church for a bank loan to be a security, and as a large, sophisticated investor, Wa-
chovia was not the type of investor that the securities laws generally seek to protect.  
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swap was not a security-based swap agreement.
89
  The court did not 
need to reach the latter, more difficult, question about which the 
SEC and the defendants in Langford and LeCroy have disagreed. 
About four years after St. Matthew’s, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in School District of the City 
of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank considered whether a LIBOR-based 
“swaption” was a security-based swap agreement.
90
  Butler County 
General Authority had issued bonds for the benefit of the Erie School 
District (the “School Bonds”).
91
  The School Bonds bore interest at 
fixed interest rates.
92
  A few years after the School Bonds were issued, 
interest rates dropped, making it desirable for the school district to 
refinance the bonds.
93
  Because of the terms of the bonds and limita-
tions under the tax laws, however, the school district could not re-
finance merely by issuing new bonds and immediately repaying the 
 
See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66–67 (indicating that a note is presumed to be a security and 
describing when the presumption is rebutted). 
 89 The plaintiff in School District of Erie made this point.  Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV 07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009).   
 90 Id.  
[I]n a swaption, one party [Party A] . . . has the right, but not 
the obligation, to enter into . . . . [a] swap with the other party 
[Party B] . . . at a specified fixed rate and floating rate formula, 
on a specified date or during a specified period in the future.  
In exchange for that right, [Party A] will pay an option premi-
um to [Party B] on the trade date. 
THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 310 (Sylvan G. Feldstein & Frank J. Fabozzi, 
eds., 2008).  As explained in the School District of Erie complaint, if Party A is to receive 
the floating rate under the contract, “[the swaption] is designed to give [Party A] the 
benefit of the agreed upon [fixed rate] if the market rates are higher . . . ; the con-
verse is true if the holder of the swaption receives the fixed rate under the swap 
agreement.”  Complaint ¶ 9, Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 
07688-LP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2008 WL 5367780  [hereinafter Erie Complaint]. 
 91 Erie Complaint, supra note 90, ¶ 10.   
 92 See Brief for Plaintiffs, School District of the City of Erie and Butler County 
General Authority, in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) at 6, Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2008 WL 5593915 
[hereinafter School District Brief] (indicating that the School Bonds were fixed rate 
bonds).  Although the opinion and pleadings are not clear on this point, the bonds 
very likely had multiple maturities and different interest rates associated with each 
maturity. 
 93 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint at 5, Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CIV 7688LAP 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2008 WL 5596124 [hereinafter JP Morgan Motion to Dis-
miss].  
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old ones.
94
  It could, however, achieve a similar economic result 
through a “synthetic refunding” accomplished by issuing a fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaption.
95
  Accordingly, in exchange for a pay-
ment of $755,000, the Butler County General Authority, as the school 
district’s agent, issued a swaption to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (“J.P. 
Morgan”) under which J.P. Morgan had the right at any time between 
2011 and 2021 to enter into an interest rate swap with the authority.
96
  
If J.P. Morgan exercised its option, the authority would make period-
ic payments under the swap based on a fixed rate that had been de-
termined in reference to the fixed interest rates on the School Bonds, 
and J.P. Morgan would make periodic payments based on a floating 
rate determined in reference to LIBOR.
97
  About five years after the 
parties entered into the swaption, the school district filed a lawsuit 
against J.P. Morgan, claiming violations of Exchange Act section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
98
 
The District Court dismissed the claims, finding that the 
swaption did not constitute a security-based swap agreement.
99
  In 
reaching its decision, the court looked to St. Matthew’s, suggesting 
that the New Jersey District Court had held broadly that “LIBOR 
based swaps are not security-based [swap agreements].”
100
  The court 
also cited In re Snell & LeCroy,
101
 an SEC administrative proceeding, as 
“holding . . . that even if . . . parties enter[] into an interest rate swap 
agreement at the same time as [an] underlying bond transaction, the 
two transactions are not a single transaction with a bond compo-
nent.”
102
  The court confusingly indicated that, “similarly,” the fixed 
 
 94 Id. (“[A]pplicable treasury regulations restricted [the school district] from re-
financing” the School Bonds immediately).   
 95 Id. (indicating that the school district could “benefit immediately” by entering 
into the swaption).  In simple terms, a “synthetic refunding” is a means by which a 
borrower can achieve the economic benefit of repaying (or providing for the repay-
ment of) outstanding bonds with proceeds from the issuance of new bonds, but 
without actually taking those steps.  The mechanics of, and economics underlying, a 
synthetic refunding are beyond the scope of this Article.  For a simple explanation, 
see THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 310–11. 
 96 Erie Complaint, supra note 90, ¶ 32. 
 97 Id. ¶ 10.  
 98 Id. ¶¶ 34–39.  
 99 Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV 
07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 100 Id.  
 101 In re Snell & LeCroy, Exchange Act Release No. 330, 2007 WL 1297008 (May 3, 
2007) [hereinafter Snell & LeCroy Release] . 
 102 Sch. Dist. of Erie, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (citing Snell & LeCroy Release, supra 
note 101, at *32–33). 
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rate in the swaption was the interest rate on the School Bonds.
103
  
Moreover, according to the court, the only material term in the swap 
was the floating rate, which was based on LIBOR.
104
  Therefore, like 
the court in St. Matthew’s, the court in School District of Erie found that, 
because LIBOR is an interest rate, a material term of the swaption 
was not based “on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security, 
or any group, or index of securities” and thus was not a security-based 
swap agreement.
105
 
The district court’s reasoning in School District of Erie is almost in-
comprehensible.
106
  It is hard to understand how the holding in Snell 
& LeCroy is relevant to the School District of Erie decision.  Perhaps the 
court was suggesting inartfully that the Snell & LeCroy holding in-
forms the meaning of “based on” in the security-based swap agree-
ment definition—that, just as entering into a swap at the same time as 
a related bond transaction does not create a sufficient nexus for the 
swap and the bonds to be considered a single transaction, neither 
does the fact that the fixed rate in the School District of Erie swaption 
was determined using the fixed rates on the School Bonds mean that 
the fixed rate in the swaption was “based on” the fixed rates on the 
School Bonds. 
If the court indeed was suggesting that Snell & LeCroy applied 
analogously, this suggestion seems off the mark.  Whether two sepa-
rate transactions should be treated as a single transaction—which was 
the issue in Snell & LeCroy—is different from whether a term in a 
document is based on something else.  Snell & LeCroy dealt with 
whether interest rate swaps related to certain bonds could be consid-
ered “municipal securities business” and therefore subject to Munici-
pal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) jurisdiction.
107
  Because the 
MSRB had jurisdiction over municipal bond transactions, but “no ju-
risdiction over derivatives in the municipal market,” the transactions 
needed to be collapsed if MSRB jurisdiction were to apply to the 
swaps.
108
  A Snell & LeCroy-styled argument in School District of Erie 
 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id.  
 105 Id.; see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206B, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006), re-
pealed by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1759 (2010) 
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c note) (defining “security-based swap agreement”) 
 106 Understanding the court’s reasoning is very difficult because the court did not 
issue an “opinion” in the case, but instead had a transcript of the proceedings pre-
pared.  See Sch. Dist. of Erie, 2009 WL 234128 (representing a transcript of proceed-
ings). 
 107 Snell & LeCroy Release, supra note 101, at *32. 
 108 Id. 
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would have been that the swaption and the School Bonds together 
were a single transaction, and because the School Bonds are securi-
ties
109
 subject to Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the 
swaption also is subject to those provisions.  This, however, was not 
the plaintiffs’ argument.
110
  In School District of Erie, the plaintiffs as-
serted that the swaption was subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
not because the swaption and the School Bonds together represented 
a single security, but because the swaption had a fixed rate  based on 
the interest rates on the School Bonds and therefore was a security-
based swap agreement.
111
 
The School District of Erie opinion and the related briefs with re-
spect to the defendant’s motion to dismiss do not indicate exactly 
how the fixed rate in the swaption related to the fixed interest rates 
on the School Bonds, but it is not uncommon for the fixed rate in a 
synthetic refunding swaption to equal the average interest rate on the 
outstanding bonds.
112
  If that was the case in School District of Erie—
and, based on the allegations in the complaint and the plaintiffs’ 
brief in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, it probably 
was—it seems hard to argue that the fixed rate in the swaption was 
not based on the interest rates on the bonds.  Similar to the swap in 
St. Matthew’s, the fixed interest rates on the School Bonds were more 
 
 109 There is no question that the bonds were securities.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77b(a)(1), 77c(a)(2) (2006) (including “bond” in the definition of “security” and 
specifying that a “security issued . . . by any political subdivision of a State . . ., or by 
any public instrumentality of one or more States” is an exempted security); id. § 
78c(a)(10) (including “bond” in the definition of “security”); id. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(ii), 
(a)(29) (defining “securities which are direct obligations of . . . a State or any politi-
cal subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political 
subdivision thereof” as exempted securities); Erie Complaint, supra note 90, ¶ 2 (stat-
ing that the Butler County General Authority, the issuer of the bonds, “is a public 
instrumentality and body corporate and politic in the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia”). 
 110 In fact, the argument would not have made sense in Erie because the bonds 
were issued two or more years before the swaption.  See Erie Complaint, supra note 90, 
¶¶ 8, 40 (indicating that the swaps were entered into in 2003 and the bonds were 
denominated as a 2000 series). 
 111 See School District Brief, supra note 92, at 6 (noting that one of the material 
terms of the swaption was “the fixed rate of the School [Bonds]”). 
 112 THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 310.  DEC Associates, 
Inc. (“DEC”), a swap advisor that assisted the County of Dare, North Carolina, in 
2005, described a swaption with UBS structured in this way.  DEC ASSOCS., INC., CNTY. 
OF DARE, N.C., PRELIMINARY SWAP ANALYSIS (2005), available at 
http://www.darenc.com/BOC/2005/Attachments/0516at6.pdf.  According to DEC, 
in the UBS swaption structure, “[i]f UBS exercise[d] the option, . . . the County 
[would] pay UBS a fixed swap rate equal to the average coupon of the [debt to be 
refinanced].”  Id. 
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than a fundamental part of determining the fixed rate under the 
swaption.  Therefore, applying Rorech’s interpretation, a term of the 
swaption—its fixed rate—was based on the interest rate of a security. 
Even more perplexing than School District of Erie’s reference to 
Snell & LeCroy is the court’s statement that the “only material term” 
under the swaption was the floating rate, which was based on 
LIBOR.
113
  It is hard to imagine an interest rate swap—or any other 
contract for that matter—with a single material term.  At a minimum, 
a floating-to-fixed interest rate swap has three material terms: the 
floating rate, the fixed rate, and the notional amount.  Without all 
three, there is no swap. 
The only real issue in School District of Erie—and the one the 
court ignored—was whether the fact that the fixed rate in the 
swaption was determined from the fixed rates on the School Bonds 
meant that either the floating rate or fixed rate in the swaption was 
based on the price, yield, value or volatility of an interest in the 
School Bonds.  The School District of Erie swaption otherwise met the 
definition of “security-based swap agreement.”
114
 
The plaintiffs in School District of Erie tried to help the court dis-
tinguish the School District of Erie swaption from the swap at issue in St. 
Matthew’s by pointing out that the floating rate in the St. Matthew’s 
swap was the same as the interest rate in a note, which was not a secu-
rity, and that the fixed rate in the School District of Erie swaption was 
determined from the fixed rates on the School Bonds, which were se-
 
 113 Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV 
07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 114 The swaption was a swap agreement because it was an option on an interest rate 
swap, which specifically is included in the GLBA § 206A definition.  See Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act §§ 206A(a)(3), 206(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006) (including 
an interest rate swap in paragraph (3) and providing that an option on an agree-
ment, contract or transaction described in paragraph (3) is included in the defini-
tion of “swap agreement”).  The court in School District of Erie did not address this 
point, but the defendant admitted as much.  JP Morgan Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 93, at 7.  Because the fixed rate in the swaption most likely represented the av-
erage fixed interest rate on the School Bonds, the swaption’s fixed rate easily could 
be considered based on the School Bonds, which were securities.  See supra note 112 
and accompanying text (describing how the swaption may have been structured); 
supra note 109 (indicating that municipal bonds are securities).  The fixed rate un-
der the swaption was material because, in Rorech terms, it “was plainly part of, if not all 
of, the consideration for which” J.P. Morgan agreed to make LIBOR-based floating 
rate payments.  SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  Moreover, 
it was the rate on which J.P. Morgan would base its decision as to whether to exercise 
the swaption.  If market rates stayed below the fixed rate in the swaption, J.P. Morgan 
would exercise the swaption so that it would receive the higher fixed rate.  If market 
rates rose above the fixed rate in the swaption, J.P. Morgan would not exercise it, 
benefiting instead from the higher market rates. 
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curities.
115
  The School District of Erie court did not attach any signifi-
cance to this distinction, however, and relied instead—with what ap-
pears to be little thought—on the fact that the St. Matthew’s “[c]ourt’s 
analysis went exclusively to the LIBOR rate and said nothing about 
the underlying.”
116
  Because the St. Matthew’s swap was floating-to-
fixed and the floating rate corresponded to the interest rate under 
the note, the court in that case appropriately focused on the LIBOR-
based floating rate.  In contrast, the School District of Erie court should 
have focused on the fixed rate under the swaption because it related 
to the interest rates on the School Bonds.  By failing to do so, the 
School District of Erie court missed the real issue. 
3. Caiola, Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York was the first court to give the term “security-based swap 
agreement” any specific attention, but the attention it gave was not 
terribly meaningful.  In Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., the court considered 
a private cause of action under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 with respect to, among other things, equity swaps entered into 
prior to the enactment of the CFMA.
117
  The Caiola equity swaps con-
sisted of agreements under which Louis Caiola, the plaintiff, agreed 
to pay to Citibank “interest” on a notional amount representing the 
price of a specified number of shares of Philip Morris stock, plus the 
amount of any losses resulting from decreases in the price of the 
stock.
118
  In exchange, Citibank agreed to pay Caiola the amount of 
any dividends paid on the Philip Morris shares, plus the amount of 
any gains resulting from increases in the price of the stock.
119
 
 
 115 School District Brief, supra note 92, at 6. 
 116 Sch. Dist. of Erie, 2009 WL 234128, at *1. 
 117 Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 n.1, 366–67, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 118 Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 119 Id.  The Second Circuit gave the following example of how the Caiola equity 
swaps worked: 
[I]f Caiola synthetically purchased 1000 shares of Philip Morris at $50 
per share, the notional value of that transaction would be $50,000.  Be-
cause this notional value would resemble a loan from Citibank, Caiola 
would pay interest at a predetermined rate on the $50,000.  If Philip 
Morris’s stock price fell $10, Caiola would pay Citibank $10,000.  If the 
stock price rose $10, Citibank would pay Caiola $10,000.  Citibank also 
would pay Caiola the value of any dividends that Caiola would have re-
ceived had he actually owned 1000 physical shares. 
Id. 
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The District Court discussed the CFMA amendments to section 
10(b) and stated, without any analysis, that the equity swaps “indis-
putably” would have been subject to section 10(b), as amended, had 
they been entered after the CFMA was enacted.
120
  In an appeal of the 
dismissal of the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Se-
cond Circuit, also without analysis, similarly indicated that, “had 
Caiola entered into his [equity swaps] after the enactment of the 
CFMA, they clearly would [have been] covered under Rule 10b-5.”
121
 
Although the district court and the Second Circuit in Caiola 
merely stated conclusions without any analysis, their conclusions that 
the equity swaps at issue in the case were security-based swap agree-
ments were undoubtedly correct.  GLBA section 206A specifically in-
cludes equity swaps in the definition of swap agreement.
122
  The Caiola 
swaps provided that payments were to be exchanged as a result of 
changes in the price of Philip Morris stock.
123
  Therefore, a term of 
each swap related to a price
124
 and the price was of traditional stock—a 
security.
125
  The relationship between the term and the price of the 
stock was direct.  If the price of Philip Morris stock went up or down, 
payments equal to the entire amount of the increase or decrease mul-
tiplied by the notional amount were due.  Price did not merely repre-
sent a fundamental part of the term; the term had no meaning with-
out price.  If the phrase “based on” in the definition of “security-based 
swap agreement” does not include such a close relationship, it is hard 
 
 120 Caiola, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 371. 
 121 Caiola, 295 F.3d at 327. 
 122 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006).  Under 
GLBA section 206A(a), the agreement must be “between eligible contract partici-
pants” and “the material terms of [the agreement] (other than price and quantity) 
[must be] subject to individual negotiation.”  Id. § 206A(a).  Citibank was, and Caiola 
almost assuredly was also, an eligible contract participant.  See 7 U.S.C. § 
1a(12)(A)(i), (xi) (2006) (including in the definition of “eligible contract partici-
pant” financial institutions and individuals with total assets in excess of $10 million); 
see also supra note 32 (discussing the definition of “eligible contract participant”).  
The Second Circuit described Caiola as a “sophisticated investor” and “a major client 
of Citibank Private Bank.”  Caiola, 295 F.3d at 315.  Moreover, Caiola and Citibank 
assuredly negotiated the terms of the equity swaps.  See id. at 317–18 (describing the 
master agreement and trade confirmations Caiola and Citibank executed). 
 123 See Caiola, 295 F.3d at 316. 
 124 The equity swaps also provided that Citibank would pay to Caiola the amount 
of any dividends paid on Philip Morris shares.  Id.  Because the swaps required pay-
ments determined in reference to changes in price, one need not determine wheth-
er the term requiring the payment of dividends is based on price, yield, value, or vol-
atility for purposes of the definition of security-based swap agreement. 
 125 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (including “stock” in the definition of “securi-
ty”); id. § 78c(a)(10) (same); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 
(1985) (concluding that traditional stock clearly is a security). 
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to imagine that any relationship could satisfy the definition.  Finally, 
the term represented a significant portion of the consideration under 
the agreement and therefore was material. 
In Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered 
whether swaps that referenced Volkswagen’s stock, which is listed on 
a German stock exchange, were subject to Exchange Act section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
126
  The swaps in Elliott were similar to the equity 
swaps in Caiola—in that they required the plaintiffs to make payments 
to the swap counterparties when Volkswagen’s stock price rose and 
required the counterparties to make payments to the plaintiffs when 
Volkswagen’s stock price fell.
127
  The issue in the case, however, was 
not whether the swaps were security-based swap agreements—the 
court, without discussion, referred to them as such—but whether sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applied to a security-based swap agreement 
with respect to a security listed on a foreign exchange.
128
  Looking to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.,
129
 the district court determined that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 did not apply.
130
 
SEC v. Wyly involved allegations of illegal insider trading under 
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to a swap in 
which five companies were to receive gains from, and pay losses on, 
two million shares of Sterling Software, Inc. stock.
131
  In its complaint, 
the SEC described the swap as a “security-based swap agreement.”
132
  
The swap, however, was entered into prior to enactment of the 
CFMA, a point that the defendants raised in moving for dismissal of 
the insider trading claims.
133
  Accordingly, in ruling on the defend-
ants’ motion, the court did not consider whether the swap fit the 
CFMA definition. 
Finally, in SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., the SEC claimed viola-
tions of Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) 
 
 126 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 127 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Porsche Automobil Holding 
SE’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or on the Basis of Forum Non 
Conveniens at 8, Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 10 Civ. 0532  (HB), 10 Civ. 4155 (HB)).   
 128 Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
 129 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 130 Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476.  
 131 788 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 n.37 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 132 Complaint ¶ 77, SEC v. Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 
5760), 2010 WL 3133915.   
 133 Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92 at 120. 
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and Rule 10b-5 with respect to CDSs related to a synthetic collateral-
ized debt obligation known as ABACUS 2007-AC-1.
134
  The SEC’s 
complaint alleged that the swaps were security-based swap agree-
ments, and while the defendant did not “concede that the SEC’s 
characterization . . . [was] correct,”
135
 he did not argue the point in 
his motion to dismiss.
136
  Therefore, the court’s opinion regarding the 
defendant’s motion does not address whether the swaps were in fact 
security-based swap agreements. 
The Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs opinions are short on details 
as to the actual mechanics of the swaps at issue in those cases.  Never-
theless, it seems very likely that the swaps in those cases would meet 
the definition of security-based swap agreement.  With payments be-
ing exchanged based on gains and losses with respect to Volkswagen 
and Sterling Software stock, the swaps in Elliott and Wyly were similar 
to those at issue in Caiola and likely would be security-based swap 
agreements for the same reasons as the Caiola swaps were.  Similarly, 
the Goldman Sachs CDSs almost certainly were priced taking into ac-
count securities associated with ABACUS and therefore were likely 
security-based swap agreements for the reasons cited in Rorech. 
III. LANGFORD AND LECROY 
Rorech was the first substantive opinion regarding SEC enforce-
ment of a security-based swap agreement, but the SEC’s first en-
forcement action with respect to an alleged security-based swap 
agreement was filed two years earlier, in April 2008, against Larry 
Langford, the then-mayor of Birmingham, Alabama and former pres-
ident of the Jefferson County, Alabama, commission; Blount Parrish 
& Co., Inc., a Montgomery, Alabama, broker-dealer; William Blount, 
 
 134 SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 147 (S.D.N.Y.  2011).  
[CDOs] are debt securities collateralized by debt obligations, including 
[RMBSs].  These securities are packaged and generally held by a spe-
cial purpose vehicle that issues notes entitling their holders to pay-
ments derived from the underlying assets.  In a synthetic CDO, the spe-
cial purpose vehicle does not own a portfolio of [RMBSs], but enters 
into credit default swaps . . . that reference the performance of the 
portfolio. 
Id. at 150 n.2.  For further discussion of how CDOs work, see In re Sec. Capital Assur-
ance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 574–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 135 Reply Memorandum of Law of Fabrice Tourre in Support of His Motion to 
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 8 n.11, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. 
Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-cv-3229), 2011 WL 1291012. 
 136 See generally Memorandum of Law of Fabrice Tourre in Further Support of His 
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 8 n.11, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 
790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-cv-3229), 2010 WL 5889174. 
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a co-owner of Blount Parrish; and Albert LaPierre, an Alabama lobby-
ist.
137
  In SEC v. Langford, the SEC alleged that Langford, Blount, 
Blount Parrish, and LaPierre violated Securities Act section 17(a) and 
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in connection with four 
interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $3.5 billion in total) en-
tered into by Jefferson County with respect to various series of bonds 
issued by the county.
138
  In 2009, the SEC initiated a related enforce-
ment action against Charles LeCroy and Douglas MacFaddin, both of 
whom were managing directors of J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
139
  In 
SEC v. LeCroy, the SEC claimed violations of Securities Act section 
17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to 
the three interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $2 billion in to-
tal) at issue in Langford that had been entered into between the coun-
ty and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a commercial bank affiliated with 
J.P. Morgan Securities.
140
 
All of the interest rate swaps at issue in Langford and LeCroy pro-
vided that one of the parties would make floating rate payments de-
termined in reference to the Securities Industry and Financial Mar-
kets Association’s (SIFMA) Municipal Swap Index (“the SIFMA 
Index”).
141
  The SEC alleged in the Langford and LeCroy complaints 
 
 137 See Langford Complaint, supra note 20; see also Langford Release, supra note 19 
(“The case is the SEC’s first enforcement action involving security-based swap 
agreements.”). 
 138 Langford Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 1–5, 11–12.  The various series of 
“bonds” that the SEC refers to in its complaint technically are denominated “war-
rants.”  See, e.g., JEFFERSON CNTY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT REGARDING $1,155,765,000 
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, SEWER REVENUE REFUNDING WARRANTS, SERIES 2003-B 
(2003), available at 
http://jeffco.jccal.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/FINANCE_PAGE_GROUP/ 
INVESTOR_RELATIONS/TAB60915/2003-B%20OFFICIAL%20STATEMENT.PDF.  
In the SEC’s related enforcement action against Charles LeCroy and Douglas 
MacFaddin, MacFaddin’s motion to dismiss appropriately referred to the Jefferson 
County “bonds” as “warrants.”  Defendant Douglas W. MacFaddin’s Motion to Dis-
miss at 5, SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2010) [hereinafter 
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss].  The SEC presumably referred to the “warrants” as 
“bonds” because the warrants would have had to have met the definition of “State or 
local bond” under the Internal Revenue Code in order to be tax exempt.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (excluding interest on state and local bonds from gross income).  
Consistent with the SEC’s nomenclature, this Article also refers to the “warrants” as 
“bonds.”   
 139 SEC Charges Two Former Directors of J.P. Morgan Securities with Fraud in 
Connection with Unlawful Payment Scheme to Obtain Municipal Bond and Swap 
Business, Litigation Release No. 21280, 2009 WL 3631040  (Nov. 4, 2009). 
 140 LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶ 2, 5. 
 141 Langford Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 16; LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶ 
18–19.  When the swaps were entered into, the index was called The Bond Market 
Association Municipal Swap Index (the “BMA Index”).  See id. ¶ 16 (referring to the 
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that the swaps were security-based swap agreements because the float-
ing rate payments were based “on the value” of the SIFMA Index and 
the SIFMA Index is an index of securities that was “used to establish 
the floating rate yield.”
142
  The defendants disagreed with the SEC’s 
characterization of the swaps and filed motions to dismiss the SEC’s 
claims. 
No decision will be forthcoming in Langford as to whether the 
SIFMA Index swaps were security-based swap agreements.  The SEC’s 
enforcement actions against Blount, Blount Parrish & Co., Inc., and 
LaPierre were resolved by consent judgments in July 2010.
143
  In 
March 2011, without issuing an opinion, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Langford’s mo-
tion to dismiss,
144
 and in August 2011, the court granted summary 
judgment against Langford in the SEC’s enforcement action without 
a determination as to whether the Jefferson County swaps were secu-
rity-based swap agreements.
145
 
 
BMA Index); LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶ 18–19 (same); Answering Your Ques-
tions About the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Municipal 
Swap Index, SIFMA (Nov. 1, 2010), 
http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=1690 [hereinafter About SIFMA] (indi-
cating that the SIFMA Index formerly was referred to as the BMA Index).  SIFMA is 
the successor to the Bond Market Association.  Id.  
 142 Langford Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 16; LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶ 
18–19. 
 143 SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2010) (order grant-
ing final judgment and permanent injunction as to Albert W. LaPierre); SEC v. Lang-
ford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2010) (order granting final judgment 
and permanent injunction as to William B. Blount); SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-
00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2010)(order granting final judgment and permanent 
injunction as to Blount Parish & Co., Inc.). 
 144 SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. March 30, 2011) (order 
denying motion to dismiss). 
 145 SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-761-AKK (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011).  In March 
2010, Langford was convicted on sixty-one counts of bribery, conspiracy, money 
laundering, mail fraud, wire fraud, filing false personal income tax returns, and crim-
inal forfeiture.  See United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 
2011); Sherrel Stewart, Former Birmingham Mayor Larry Langford Reports to Federal Prison 
in Kentucky, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Apr. 7, 2010, 11:30 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/04/former_birmingham_mayor_larry_4.html.  
The SEC’s claims in Langford included not only fraud claims with respect to the 
swaps, but also fraud claims with respect to the related bonds.  Langford Complaint, 
supra note 20, ¶¶ 11, 14.  In its summary judgment motion, the SEC argued that 
Langford’s conviction estopped him from disputing the allegations in the SEC’s en-
forcement action and that the resolution of whether the swaps were security-based 
swap agreements was unnecessary because there was no dispute that the activities 
complained of were in connection with bonds, “which are undeniably securities,” 
subject to Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Larry P. Langford at 
MOLONY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  12:32 PM 
980 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:953 
In LeCroy, the District Court denied LeCroy’s and MacFaddin’s 
motions to dismiss on procedural grounds without reaching a conclu-
sion as to whether the relevant Jefferson County swaps were security-
based swap agreements.
146
  An answer to the question remains possi-
ble in that case. 
A. Arguments of the Defendants and SIFMA 
In support of their motions to dismiss, the defendants in Lang-
ford and LeCroy argued that the Jefferson County swaps were not secu-
rity-based swap agreements for two reasons.  First, the SIFMA Index is 
not an index of securities, but an index of interest rates.
147
  Second, 
even if the SIFMA Index were an index of securities, no material term 
of any of the swaps was based on “the price, yield, value or volatility” 
of the SIFMA Index.
148
 
SIFMA made the same arguments in an amicus curiae brief that 
it filed in Langford.
149
  In the brief, SIFMA explained how the SIFMA 
Index works.  According to SIFMA, the SIFMA Index is calculated 
based on interest rates from over 600 tax-exempt variable rate de-
mand obligations (VRDOs) whose rates are adjusted each week to re-
flect existing market conditions.
150
  SIFMA noted that the database 
 
1–2, 9, 14 n.3, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 16, 2010); 
Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Larry P. 
Langford, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011). 
 146 See SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2010) 
(denying the defendants’ motions and noting that the question of whether the Jef-
ferson County swaps were security-based swap agreements was one that “[the] court 
[could not] resolve . . . on a motion to dismiss”). 
 147 See Motion to Dismiss of William B. Blount and Blount Parrish & Co., Inc. at 
11–14, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. June 27, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter Blount Motion to Dismiss]; Motion of Charles LeCroy to Dismiss Complaint at 8–
11, Securities Exchange Commission v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 19, 
2010) [hereinafter LeCroy Motion to Dismiss]; MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 138, at 13–18.  Langford and LaPierre filed motions to dismiss that incorpo-
rated the motion to dismiss of Blount and Blount Parrish.  Motion to Dismiss of Al-
bert W. LaPierre, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. June 30, 2008); 
Motion to Dismiss of Larry P. Langford, Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. June 30, 2008). 
 148 See Blount Motion to Dismiss, supra note 147, at 14–15; LeCroy Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 147, at 7–8; MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 18–22. 
 149 See Brief for Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Defendants at 14–25, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK 
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2008) [hereinafter SIFMA Brief]. 
 150 Id. at 9.  “[VRDOs] are financial instruments whose yield is reset [by a re-
marketing agent] on a regular basis, such as daily, weekly, monthly or even semian-
nually[,] . . . to bring it in line with the broader interest rate market.”  THE 
HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 1129–30.  VRDOs typically allow an 
investor to tender its security on each reset date at a price equal to par plus accrued 
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used to calculate the index is controlled by Municipal Market Data 
(MMD), that the identities of the specific VRDOs used to calculate 
the index are not known to SIFMA, and that the VRDOs used in the 
index change from week to week.
151
  SIFMA also indicated that only 
interest rates are used to calculate the index and that “[o]ther terms 
of the [VRDOs] . . . are not reported as part of the [index].”
152
  
SIFMA asserted that, accordingly, the SIFMA Index is intended to be 
a “benchmark interest rate.”
153
 
To support its claim that the SIFMA Index is an index of interest 
rates, not securities, SIFMA cited the fact that SIFMA Index swaps are 
used to hedge against interest rate fluctuations.
154
  Moreover, accord-
ing to SIFMA, the SIFMA Index “is well understood in the market-
place . . . [as] the tax-exempt market equivalent of LIBOR, which is 
an index of . . . interest rates.”
155
  Referring to the conclusion in St. 
Matthew’s that LIBOR-based swaps are not security-based swap agree-
ments, SIFMA argued that it would be inconsistent to determine that 
a SIFMA Index swap is a security-based swap agreement when its most 
common alternative—a LIBOR swap—is not a security-based swap 
agreement.
156
  SIFMA acknowledged that the VRDOs used to calculate 
the SIFMA Index are securities, but asserted that the use of VRDOs 
for the calculation does not mean that the index is an index of secu-
rities.
157
  According to SIFMA, the only reason that the interest rates 
 
interest, and the remarketing agent sets each rate so that tendered obligations may 
be resold at par.  Id. at 1130; ROBERT A FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC 
FINANCE § 5:3.4[B] (2d ed. 2010). 
 151 SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 10. 
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. at 22.  MacFaddin argued that the fact that no other terms of the VRDOs 
are involved in calculating the SIFMA Index indicates that the SIFMA Index solely is 
a “benchmark interest rate.”  MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 14. 
 154 SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 20. 
 155 Id. at 8.  In his reply brief to the SEC’s response to his motion to dismiss, 
MacFaddin clarified that “LIBOR is not ‘based on’ a bank lending rate, [but] is a 
bank lending rate . . . ‘based on’ the interest rates on loans made between banks.”  
Defendant Douglas W. MacFaddin’s Reply in Further Support of His Motion to Dis-
miss at 12 n.10, SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter MacFaddin Reply].    
 156 SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 22.  MacFaddin made a similar claim.  See 
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 16–18 (arguing that the SIFMA In-
dex is an alternative to LIBOR and that treating the two differently would be inap-
propriate). 
 157 SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 19; see also Reply Brief of the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association in Support of its Motion for Leave to File a Brief 
Amicus Curiae at 8, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. Jan. 19, 
2010) [hereinafter SIFMA Reply]. 
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used in the SIFMA Index are those from securities is that tax-exempt 
interest rates apply only to municipal bonds,
158
 which are securities. 
In arguing that no material term of any of the swaps was based 
on the value or yield of the SIFMA Index, SIFMA asserted that the 
swaps could not be based on the value of the index because the index 
does not include values but interest rates.
159
  MacFaddin added that 
characterizing the SIFMA Index as the value of the underlying securi-
ties is inconsistent with the distinction between “value” and “level” in 
the definition of “swap agreement.”
160
  The term “level,” MacFaddin 
argued, applies to interest rates, while the term “value” applies to true 
indexes of securities, which measure the performance of the securi-
ties in the index.
161
  SIFMA, Blount, and MacFaddin all contended 
that the SIFMA Index does not represent a yield because, to calculate 
yield on a debt instrument, one must have not only the interest rate, 
but also the purchase price, the rate at which interest accrues, and 
the holding period.
162
  MacFaddin noted that an “[i]nterest rate is an 
express term of a bond (like principal amount and maturity date), 
while yield is not.  Yield is a mathematical calculation using compo-
nents that reflect market conditions and other factors (including the 
interest rate).”
163
 
In addition to their specific arguments, SIFMA, Blount, and 
MacFaddin argued broadly that Congress did not intend the term se-
curity-based swap agreement to include interest rate swaps.  SIFMA 
contended that, because of pre-CFMA case law that held that the se-
curities laws did not apply to interest rate swaps, for the term “securi-
ty-based swap agreement” to include interest rate swaps, Congress 
needed to state so explicitly.
164
  Blount observed that, under the defi-
nition adopted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) and incorporated by reference in the Jefferson County swap 
documents, the SIFMA Index means “the index which is issued week-
ly and is compiled from the weekly interest rate resets of tax-exempt vari-
 
 158 SIFMA Reply, supra note 157, at 8.  MacFaddin made a similar argument.  See 
MacFaddin Reply, supra note 155, at 12 (“The interest rates used in the SIFMA Index 
are derived from securities for the sole purpose of capturing a tax exempt rate.  In-
terest is only tax exempt if it accrues on a municipal bond.” (citations omitted)). 
 159 SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 23. 
 160 MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 19. 
 161 Id. at 20. 
 162 SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 24; see Blount Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
147, at 15 (citing the definition of yield used by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board); MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 20-–21. 
 163 MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 21. 
 164 SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 21. 
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able rate issues included in a database maintained by Municipal Mar-
ket Data.”
165
  According to Blount, then, for the Jefferson County 
swaps to be security-based swap agreements, the definition of “securi-
ty-based swap agreement” would need to be expanded to include not 
only “an index of securities,” but also “an index of the rates of underly-
ing securities.”
166
  MacFaddin likewise claimed that, for SIFMA Index 
swaps to be subject to Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act 
section 10(b), one would need to interpret “index of securities” to 
mean “index of interest rates extracted from a group of securities.”
167
  
Moreover, MacFaddin maintained that the definition of “swap 
agreement” in GLBA section 206A separately states that there may be 
agreements based on “interest or other rates” and agreements based 
on “securities” or “instruments of indebtedness,” and, in light of that, 
the only reasonable interpretation is that the term “security-based 
swap agreement” applies only to the latter.
168
 
B. Counterarguments of the SEC 
In responding to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and 
SIFMA’s amicus brief, the SEC argued primarily that, procedurally, 
the defendants had not met the legal standard required for dismis-
sal.
169
  The SEC did, however, raise some substantive arguments.  In 
Langford, the SEC argued that both the ISDA definition and the de-
scription of the SIFMA Index on SIFMA’s website indicate that the 
SIFMA Index is an index of securities.
170
  The SEC focused on the fact 
that the rate identified in the ISDA definition references “an underly-
ing index of ‘tax exempt variable rate issues’”
171
 and that the SIFMA web-
 
 165 Blount Motion to Dismiss, supra note 147, at 12 (quoting ISDA, SUPPLEMENT 
NUMBER 19 TO THE 2000 ISDA DEFINITIONS AND ANNEX TO THE 2000 ISDA DEFINITIONS 
(2004) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at 
http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf/supplement-19-to-2000DefinitionsAnnex.pdf. 
 166 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 167 MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 15; see also MacFaddin Reply, 
supra note 155, at 12 (making a similar argument). 
 168 MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 12. 
 169 See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 38–46, SEC v. 
Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2008) [hereinafter SEC Re-
sponse to Blount] (describing the SEC’s procedural arguments against dismissal); 
Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Motions to Dismiss of Defendants Charles 
LeCroy and Douglas MacFaddin at 10–21, SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D. 
Ala. Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Response to LeCroy] (same); Plaintiff’s Response 
to the Brief of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association at 12–18, 
SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. August 27, 2008) [hereinafter 
SEC Response to SIFMA] (same). 
 170 SEC Response to Blount, supra note 169, at 47–49. 
 171 Id. at 47. 
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site describes the SIFMA Index as one consisting of VRDOs, which, 
the SEC noted, are bonds and “obviously securities.”
172
 
In LeCroy, the SEC refined and expanded its argument.  Similar 
to its approach in Langford, the SEC argued that “there is no doubt 
the interest rates used to calculate the [SIFMA] Index are interest 
rates on a group or index of bonds, which are securities.”
173
  The SEC 
went further, however, and claimed that the interest rates on the 
VRDOs relevant to the SIFMA Index are the same as their yields be-
cause one of the key features of a VRDO is the ability of the holders 
to tender the obligations at par.
174
  The SEC noted that, as a result, 
many “experts” use the terms “interest rate” and “yield” interchange-
ably when discussing VRDOs.
175
  The SEC also argued that the interest 
rates on the VRDOs are closely related to the value and volatility of 
the underlying obligations because the rates on the obligations are 
determined based on comparable securities, credit ratings, and sup-
ply and demand, and because SIFMA controls the variation of inter-
est rates in the index by eliminating obligations with interest rates 
that are outliers.
176
  According to the SEC, this was evidence that the 
SIFMA Index is based on an “interest” in the value or volatility of a 
“group of securities.”
177
 
C. The Statutory Text Supports the Conclusion that a SIFMA Index 
Swap Is a Security-Based Swap Agreement, but Policy Does Not 
The SEC’s arguments in Langford and LeCroy as to why the Jeffer-
son County swaps were security-based swap agreements are not par-
ticularly well developed.  Nevertheless, under a fair reading of the 
statute and in light of the flexibility apparently intended by Congress, 
the SEC’s claim is not unfounded. 
Of course, trying to divine what Congress intended to capture in 
the definition of the term “security-based swap agreement” is difficult 
in light of the scant legislative history with respect to the term.  What 
 
 172 Id. at 48 n.13; see SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 20 (“[T]he inter-
est rates [in the SIFMA Index] are on bonds, which are undisputedly securities.”). 
 173 SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 22; SEC Response to LeCroy, supra 
note 169, at 22. 
 174 SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 22–23; SEC Response to LeCroy, 
supra note 169, at 23–24. 
 175 SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 24; SEC Response to LeCroy, supra 
note 169, at 24. 
 176 SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 25–26; SEC Response to LeCroy, 
supra note 169, at 25–26. 
 177 SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 26; SEC Response to LeCroy, supra 
note 169, at 26. 
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little can be gleaned from the legislative history, however, is that 
Congress wanted the term to sweep broadly to cover wrongdoing, 
particularly with respect to innovations in the swap market.
178
  In light 
of that intent, a narrow interpretation of the term seems unsuitable. 
When analyzed based on its component parts, and taking into 
account Rorech’s common-sense interpretation of the meaning of 
“based on,” the definition of security-based swap agreement can rea-
sonably be construed to include a SIFMA Index swap.
179
  First, a 
SIFMA Index swap is an interest rate swap, and an interest rate swap 
clearly is a swap agreement within the meaning of GLBA section 206A.  
As discussed above with respect to St. Matthew’s and School District of 
Erie, interest rate swaps are specifically included in GLBA section 
206A(a)(3).
180
  Second, the SIFMA Index can reasonably be said to be 
based on price.  The floating rate in a SIFMA Index swap is not based 
on the SIFMA Index; it is the SIFMA Index.  Therefore, in determin-
ing whether a SIFMA Index swap is a security-based swap agreement, 
one needs to determine whether the SIFMA Index itself is based on a 
price, yield, value, or volatility.  SIFMA indicates that the interest rates 
used in the SIFMA Index are from VRDOs whose rates are adjusted 
 
 178 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 27,309 (2000) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (“Title III 
[of the CFMA] applies anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the Federal 
Securities law to securities-based swap agreements . . . .  This will enhance protection 
for investors and for the financial markets, and will permit the SEC to respond as 
necessary to developments in these markets.”); 146 CONG. REC. 27,078 (2000) (state-
ment of Rep. Dingell) (“One of the most important provisions of the [CFMA] . . . 
gives the SEC antifraud authority over securities-based swap agreements . . . .  This 
permits the SEC to use its tested methods to enhance the protection in [the swap] 
markets and to respond as necessary to developments in the future.”). 
 179 See supra Part II.B (describing the component parts of the definition of “securi-
ty-based swap agreement”). 
 180 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006); see supra 
notes 85, 114 and accompanying text (noting that the St. Matthew’s and School District 
of  Erie interest rate swaps were swap agreements under GLBA section 206A).  Of 
course, prior to Dodd-Frank, for an interest rate swap to be a swap agreement under 
GLBA section 206A, it must have been between eligible contract participants, and 
the material terms (other than price and quantity) must have been subject to indi-
vidual negotiation.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text (quoting a portion of 
the definition of “swap agreement”).  In the case of the Jefferson County swaps, these 
requirements were met.  J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Bear Stearns & Co., and Jef-
ferson County, Alabama, were all “eligible contract participants” under section 
1a(12) of the CEA.  See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12)(A)(i), (A)(v), (A)(vi) (2006) (including 
financial institutions, corporations with assets exceeding $10 million, and political 
subdivisions and instrumentalities of governmental entities owning or investing on a 
discretionary basis investments of $25 million or more).  In addition, as “negotiated 
swaps,” the material terms of the Jefferson County swaps certainly were subject to in-
dividual negotiation.  Bear Stearns & Co. was the counterparty to the one Jefferson 
County swap that was at issue in Langford, but not in LeCroy.  See Langford Complaint, 
supra note 20, ¶ 12.   
MOLONY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  12:32 PM 
986 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:953 
weekly.
181
  The rate on each of those VRDOs is adjusted to the rate 
that is required to allow the obligation to be sold at a price of par.
182
  If 
Rorech is correct—that, for a matter to be “based on” a particular fac-
tor, that factor must represent a fundamental part of the matter—the 
interest rates on the VRDOs are based on their prices.  There are other 
factors involved in determining the rates, but the par price is funda-
mental.  Without it, one could not determine the rate.  Third, the 
SIFMA Index is determined from a group of securities.  Neither SIFMA 
nor the defendants disputed that the SIFMA Index is calculated from 
interest rates on over 600 VRDOs or that those VRDOs are securities.  
Finally, the floating rate in a SIFMA Index swap is a material term.  It, 
along with the notional amount, determines the consideration for 
the fixed rate payments.  Without the floating rate term, a floating-to-
fixed interest rate swap would not be enforceable or make any 
sense.
183
 
Moreover, in light of the flexible interpretation apparently in-
tended by Congress, a court might go out of its way—for policy rea-
sons—to find that an interest rate represents a yield, value, or volatili-
ty of an interest in a group of securities as the SEC seems to suggest.  
Consider an issuer that issues bonds that bear interest at (i) LIBOR 
plus one percent when the issuer’s debt-to-equity ratio is less than or 
equal to two-to-one and (ii) LIBOR plus three percent when the ratio 
is greater than two-to-one.  Several years after the bond issuance, the 
issuer becomes uncomfortable with the interest rate risk associated 
with its variable rate bonds and enters into a “cost-of-funds” interest 
rate swap
184
 under which the counterparty agrees to pay a floating rate 
equal to the actual interest rate on the bonds and the issuer pays a 
fixed rate equal to eight percent.  The counterparty settled on the 
fixed rate because the issuer’s debt-to-equity ratio had been no more 
than one-to-one since the bonds were issued and because the issuer’s 
projections showed ratios of no more than one-to-one during the 
term of the swap.  It turns out, however, that the issuer’s projections 
 
 181 See About SIFMA, supra note 141 (“[F]or an issue to qualify for inclusion in the 
[SIFMA Index], it must . . . be a weekly reset . . . .”).  
 182 See THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 297 (“[F]or tradi-
tional [VRDOs], the rate . . . is set by the remarketing agent at a level that allows the 
bond[s] to be remarketed at a price of par.”).  
 183 See supra Part II.B.2 (citing  Rorech’s conclusion as to what constitutes a material 
term and discussing the material terms of a floating-to-fixed interest rate swap). 
 184 A cost-of-funds swap is one in which the floating rate paid by the counterparty 
equals the actual interest rate on particular debt.  See HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL 
BONDS, supra note 90, at 306 (describing a cost-of-funds swap as one in which “float-
ing leg receipts . . . match the interest payments due on the hedged bonds exactly”). 
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are fraudulent and the actual ratios exceed three-to-one six months 
into the swap.  As a result, the interest rate on the bonds increases to 
LIBOR plus three percent, and the floating rate likewise increases to 
the detriment of the counterparty.  If the cost-of-funds swap is not a 
security-based swap agreement, the counterparty would have no re-
course against the issuer under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 with respect to the fraudulent projections on which the coun-
terparty based the fixed rate.
185
  From a policy perspective, one would 
expect that such a cost-of-funds swap—one in which the floating rate 
is so intimately linked to a security—would be a security-based swap 
agreement subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it pre-
sents securities-like fraud risk.  For that reason, even if a conclusion 
that such an interest rate swap is a security-based swap agreement 
would require a tortured interpretation of the meaning of price, 
yield, value, or volatility, a court might be willing to entertain it.186   
Although, based on the statutory text, a reasonable argument 
can be made that a SIFMA Index swap is a security-based swap 
agreement, such a result makes little sense from a policy perspec-
tive.
187
  Unlike the cost-of-funds swap described above, a SIFMA Index 
swap poses virtually no risk of nefarious activities related to the un-
derlying securities.  Because only MMD knows the identity of the 
component securities, such a large number of securities are involved, 
and the component securities change from week to week, it is hard to 
think of a situation in which a SIFMA Index swap would pose the 
fraud risks normally associated with securities.  In a cost-of-funds 
swap, a party’s knowledge of information with respect to the issuer of 
the applicable debt security can raise the possibility of securities-like 
fraud.  In contrast, a party to a SIFMA Index swap will have no infor-
mation about the identity of the VRDOs that are used to determine 
the interest rate.  Even if a party did have such information, because 
 
 185 Because the issuer decided to enter into the swap several years after the bonds 
were issued, the counterparty could not argue that the fraud was in connection with 
the sale of the bonds and for that reason subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  See 
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820, 822 (2002) (concluding that a fraud that coin-
cides with securities transaction is subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
 186 Of course, SIFMA and the defendants in Langford and LeCroy could counter 
that, if such a tortured interpretation is necessary for such a cost of-funds swap to be 
included in the definition of “security-based swap agreement,” Congress clearly could 
not have intended to include a SIFMA Index swap within the definition. 
 187 See ADAM W. GLASS, “SCARY”: SEC GETS IT WRONG IN MUNI SWAP COMPLAINT 
(2008), available at http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/US/ScarySECgetsitwrong.pdf 
(indicating that the Jefferson County SIFMA Index swaps are “within the literal terms 
of the statute,” but that treating them as security-based swap agreements does not 
make sense from a policy perspective). 
MOLONY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  12:32 PM 
988 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:953 
such a large number of obligations are involved, the component ob-
ligations change, and SIFMA makes adjustments for outliers,
188
 there 
is virtually no chance of profiting by misleading the other party to the 
swap regarding the underlying securities or their issuers. 
Furthermore, as SIFMA and the defendants in Langford and 
LeCroy have pointed out, it seems inappropriate that a SIFMA Index 
swap would be a security-based swap agreement when its most com-
mon alternative—a LIBOR swap—is not.  Like LIBOR, the SIFMA 
Index merely serves as a benchmark interest rate.  Parties do not en-
ter into SIFMA Index swaps as a substitute for investing in the over 
600 VRDOs from which the index is determined.
189
 
IV. DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT OF 2010 
Dodd-Frank introduced to the world of over-the-counter deriva-
tives a new and extensive regulatory scheme that includes, among 
other things, information reporting, clearing, and exchange-trading 
requirements.
190
  The reform law divides that world into two hemi-
spheres—“swaps” and “security-based swaps.”  In general, swaps are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the CFTC and security-based swaps are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.
191
  Dodd-Frank included “secu-
rity-based swaps” in the definition of “security” under both the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act, thereby making them subject to the 
 
 188 See SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 9–10 (“[I]n calculating the SIFMA . . . In-
dex, MMD (a) eliminates variable rate demand [obligations] whose interest rates fall 
outside of +/-1.0 standard deviations and (b) limits notes handled by a single re-
marketing agent to no more than 15% of the SIFMA . . . Index.”). 
 189 See GLASS, supra note 187, at 2 (“In a municipal bond fixed-to-floating interest 
rate swap, . . . the [SIFMA] Index is supposed to be a proxy for current tax-exempt 
market rates, not an investment medium . . . .”). 
 190 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–82 (2010) 
(to be codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2) (clearing of swaps); id. § 727  124 Stat.  at 1696–97 (to 
be codified at 7 U.S.C. §2(a)) (public reporting of swaps); id. § 733 124 Stat. at 1712–
17 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 7b-2) (swap execution facilities); id. § 763, 124 Stat. at 
1762–84 (to be codified in subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78) (clearing of security-based 
swaps); § 766, 124 Stat. at 1797–99 (to be codified in subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78) 
(public reporting for security-based swaps and security-based swap execution facili-
ties); see also Ryan J. Maierson, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act:  The General Counsel’s Quick Reference Guide, in 2010 HOW TO PREPARE FOR THE 
UPCOMING PROXY SEASON at 371, 391–400 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Hand-
book Series No. B-1185, 2010) (describing the effect of Dodd-Frank on the over-the-
counter derivatives market that previously was largely unregulated). 
 191 Dodd-Frank Act § 712(b), 124 Stat. at 1642–43 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 
2(a)(1)); id. § 722(a), 124 Stat. at 1642–43 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)). 
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registration, information-reporting, and antifraud provisions of those 
laws.
192
 
The term “swap,” which Dodd-Frank added to Commodity Ex-
change Act (CEA) section 1a
193
, is broadly defined and overlaps in 
most respects with the term “swap agreement” in GLBA section 206A, 
as amended by Dodd-Frank.
194
  It excludes, however, most “security-
based swaps.”
195
 
Dodd-Frank added the term “security-based swap” to Exchange 
Act section 3(a) and defined it as an agreement, contract, or transac-
tion that would be a swap (as defined in the CEA), but for the fact 
that it is based on 
(I)an index that is a narrow-based security index, including any 
interest therein or on the value thereof; 
(II)a single security or loan, including any interest therein or on 
the value thereof; or 
(III)the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence 
of an event relating to a single issuer of a security or the issuers of 
securities in a narrow-based security index, provided that such 
event directly affects the financial statements, financial condition, 
or financial obligations of the issuer.
196
 
The term “narrow-based security index” is not new; the CFMA in 2000 
added it to both the CEA and the Exchange Act.
197
  Put simply, a nar-
row-based security index is an index with nine or fewer component 
securities, an index in which one security is weighted more than thir-
ty percent, an index in which the five most highly weighted securities 
are weighted more than sixty percent, or an index in which the secu-
rities in the bottom twenty five percent of the index’s total weight 
have low average daily trading volumes.
198
 
 
 192 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 2011); id. § 78c(a)(10). 
 193 Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§1–
25 (2006)). 
 194 Compare Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1666–69 (to be codified at 7 
U.S.C § 1a(47)), with Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note, amended 
by Dodd-Frank Act § 762(b), 124 Stat. at 1759 (to be codified as note to 15 U.S.C. 
§78c). 
 195 Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1668 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 
1a(47)(B)(x)). 
 196 Id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1756–57 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78(c)(a)(68)). 
 197 7 U.S.C. § 1a(25) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(B) (2006).  
 198 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(B) (2006).  A narrow based security index includes one 
“(iv) in which the lowest weighted component securities, comprising, in the aggre-
gate, 25 percent of the index’s weighting have an aggregate dollar value of average 
daily trading volume of less than $50,000,000 (or in the case of an index with 15 or 
more component securities, $30,000,000).”  Id.  
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Dodd-Frank appropriately recognized that a single agreement, 
contract, or transaction could have attributes of both a security-based 
swap (e.g., be based on a single stock) and a swap (e.g., be based on 
an interest rate, currency, or commodity) and provided that such an 
agreement, contract, or transaction—what Dodd-Frank refers to as a 
“mixed swap”—is both a swap and a security-based swap.
199
  Mixed 
swaps are subject to the broad jurisdiction of both the CFTC and the 
SEC. 
Notwithstanding the sweeping reform and the new jurisdictional 
division, Dodd-Frank retained the term “security-based swap agree-
ment” and most of the provisions of the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act that apply to security-based swap agreements.  The re-
form, however, did make some adjustments.  First, it moved the 
definition of “security-based swap agreement” from GLBA section 
206B to Exchange Act section 3(a)(78).
200
  Second, although the text 
of the new Exchange Act definition is substantially the same as the 
one under GLBA, its scope was curtailed because Exchange Act § 
3(a)(78) provides that “[t]he term ‘security-based swap agreement’ 
does not include any security-based swap.”
201
  Finally, Dodd-Frank 
modified the meaning of “security-based swap agreement” by amend-
ing the definition of the term “swap agreement” in GLBA section 
206A to include agreements, contracts, and transactions that are not 
entered into by eligible contract participants and those whose mate-
rial terms are not subject to individual negotiation.
202
 
Under Dodd-Frank, a security-based swap agreement is a “swap,” 
not a “security-based swap.”
203
  As “swaps,” security-based swap agree-
 
 199 See Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1668 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 
1a(47)(B)(x), (D)) (including a mixed swap in the definitions of the term “swap”); 
id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1757 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(D)) (in-
cluding a mixed swap in the definitions of the term “security-based swap”). 
 200 See Dodd-Frank Act § 762(a), 124 Stat. at 1759 (repealing Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act § 206B, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006)); id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1759 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(78)) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (2006), to add the definition of “security-based swap agree-
ment”). 
 201 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(a), (78)(B) (West 2011). 
 202 Dodd-Frank Act § 762(b), 124 Stat. at 1759 (amending Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act § 206A, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note); see supra note 31 and accompanying text (quoting 
a portion of GLBA section 206A definition of “swap agreement” before it was 
amended by Dodd-Frank).  Notwithstanding the fact that Dodd-Frank moved the def-
inition of “security-based swap agreement” from the GLBA to the Exchange Act, the 
definition in the Exchange Act still incorporates the definition of “swap agreement” 
in GLBA section 206A.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(78) (West 2011). 
 203 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(47)(A)(5) (West 2011); 15 U.S.C.A § 78c(a)(78)(B) (West 
2011). 
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ments generally are subject to CFTC jurisdiction, but through the 
continuing effectiveness of CFMA amendments, the SEC shares anti-
fraud jurisdiction over them with the CFTC.  The nomenclature used 
by Congress is a recipe for confusion, and Dodd-Frank’s legislative 
history is not very helpful in interpreting any of the three terms.  The 
legislative history includes little more than conclusory statements 
about the jurisdictional division between the SEC and the CFTC with 
respect to over-the-counter derivatives.
204
  Unfortunately, SEC Chair-
man Mary Schapiro’s 2009 testimony before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment does little to help be-
cause it describes a jurisdictional scheme different from what 
Congress finally settled on in Dodd-Frank.  In her testimony, Chair-
man Schapiro distinguished between “securities-related” derivatives 
and “non-securities-related derivatives”: 
An [over-the-counter] derivative is “securities-related” when the 
reference is to an entity that is an issuer of securities (such as a 
public company), to a security itself (or a related event such as a 
dividend payment), to a group or index of securities or issuers, or 
based on related aspects of a security or group or index of securi-
ties or issuers, such as price, yield, volatility, dividend payments, 
or value. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Securities-related [over-the-counter] derivatives would include 
equity derivatives and credit and other fixed income derivatives. 
Non-securities-related derivatives would include interest rate de-
rivatives, foreign currency derivatives, and all non-financial deriva-
tives.
205
 
Chairman Schapiro appears to have been recommending that the 
scope of the term “security-based swap agreement” be expanded and 
that the SEC’s authority with respect to security-based swap agree-
 
 204 Congressman Peterson described the jurisdictional landscape as follows: 
Title VII [of the bill] allocates authority over swaps and security-based swaps as fol-
lows.  First, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over swaps, including swaps on broad-
based security indexes. Within the swap definition is a category of swaps called secu-
rity-based swap agreements.  For this specific category of swaps, the CFTC will con-
tinue to exercise its full jurisdictional authority, while the SEC may exercise certain 
specific authorities over these products, as outlined in Title VII.  Title VII also clari-
fies that the SEC has jurisdiction over security-based swaps, which are swaps on nar-
row-based security indexes and single securities, and that the two agencies share au-
thority over mixed swaps. 
See 156 CONG. REC. H5,256 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Peterson). 
 205 Schapiro Testimony, supra note 14, at 45, 49. 
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ments be extended beyond antifraud.
206
  Indeed, she suggested that 
“primary responsibility for ‘securities-related’ [over-the-counter] de-
rivatives . . . be retained by the SEC.”
207
  She did not describe a scheme 
such as the one in Dodd-Frank under which the SEC has comprehen-
sive jurisdiction over derivatives very closely tied to securities and 
merely antifraud jurisdiction over derivatives more loosely related to 
securities. 
Although Dodd-Frank’s legislative history is not very helpful, the 
reform law provided an opportunity for clarity by directing the CFTC 
and the SEC jointly to further define the terms “swap,” “security-
based swap,” and “security-based swap agreement.”
208
  In May 2011, 
the CFTC and the SEC accordingly proposed interpretive guidance 
and, in limited cases, proposed rules with respect to the terms. 
209
  
The two commissions provided extensive guidance with respect to the 
terms “swap” and “security-based swap,” but stated that they did not 
believe it “possible to provide a bright line test to define” a security-
based swap agreement and offered only three examples of types of 
swaps that “clearly fall within the definition.”
210
  One of the exam-
ples—“a swap on an index of securities that is not a narrow-based se-
curity index”
211
—is hardly an example at all; it merely states what is 
obvious from reading the statutory definitions of “security-based swap 
agreement” and “security-based swap” together.  As to “security-based 
swap agreements,” then, the likelihood of achieving clarity appears 
bleak. 
 
 206 See id. at 49 (urging Congress to include “securities-related [over-the-counter] 
derivatives” in the definition of security and thereby subject those derivatives to 
broad regulation under the federal securities laws). 
 207 Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 
 208 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1644 (2010) 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302). 
 209 See generally Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-
Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeep-
ing, 76 Fed. Reg. 29818 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 
240) (proposing interpretive guidance and rules regarding the terms “swap,” “securi-
ty-based swap,” and “security-based swap agreement”). 
 210 Id. at 29863. 
 211 Id. 
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITY-BASED SWAP AGREEMENT: 
A CONCEPT WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED OR A BENEFICIAL REMNANT OF A 
BYGONE ERA? 
A. A Concept Whose Time Has Passed 
The spotty—and sparse—history of the term “security-based 
swap agreement” raises the question of whether the concept is need-
ed or beneficial in Dodd-Frank’s new, comprehensive regulatory 
scheme for over-the-counter derivatives.  The provisions in the Secu-
rities Act and the Exchange Act with respect to security-based swap 
agreements no doubt offer some benefits in SEC antifraud enforce-
ment.  In light of Dodd-Frank, however, the benefits are limited at 
best and are outweighed by the difficulties the concept presents.  
Therefore, for a number of reasons, Congress should eliminate the 
“security-based swap agreement” concept from the federal securities 
laws. 
1. The Concept Was Used Sparingly Prior to Dodd-Frank 
and Dodd-Frank Makes the Concept More 
Inconsequential 
Since Congress enacted the CFMA in 2000, cases involving al-
leged fraud related to security-based swap agreements have been few.  
The scope of the term was not considered by a court in a substantive 
way until 2005, when the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey decided St. Matthew’s.212  It was not until 2008—more 
than seven years after the CFMA was enacted—that the SEC brought 
its first enforcement action with respect to an alleged security-based 
swap agreement in Langford.
213
  It was not until 2010, in Rorech, that a 
court issued a substantive opinion regarding an SEC enforcement ac-
tion with respect to a security-based swap agreement.
214
  During its 
over-ten-year history, therefore, the provisions employing the term 
have been relatively inconsequential.  With the adoption of Dodd-
Frank, they are even more so. 
By excluding security-based swaps from the definition, Dodd-
Frank curtailed the scope of the term “security-based swap agree-
ment.”  As discussed above, other than the exclusion of security-based 
swaps, the definition is the same as it was prior to the reform act.  
Consequently, over-the-counter derivatives, such as the swap in St. 
 
 212 See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (discussing St. Matthew’s). 
 213 See supra Part III (discussing Langford). 
 214 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Rorech). 
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Matthew’s, which did not satisfy the pre-Dodd-Frank definition, also 
do not satisfy the post-Dodd-Frank definition.
215
  Some over-the-
counter derivatives that previously satisfied the definition of “security-
based swap agreement,” however, no longer do so because they fit the 
definition of “security-based swap.”  For example, the swaps at issue in 
Caiola and Rorech satisfied the pre-Dodd-Frank definition, but those 
same swaps would not satisfy the post-Dodd-Frank definition because 
they would be considered security-based swaps.
216
 
For an agreement, contract or transaction to be a security-based 
swap: 
• the agreement, contract or transaction must be a swap 
(without taking into account the exclusion of security-
based swaps from the definition of “swap” in CEA sec-
tion 1a(47)); and 
• the swap must be based on any one of the following: 
o a narrow-based security index or an interest in or the 
value of a narrow-based security index; 
o a single security or an interest in or the value of a 
single security; 
o a single loan or an interest in or the value of a sin-
gle loan; or 
o a financial event directly affecting a single issuer of a 
security or the issuers of securities in a narrow-
based security index. 
217
 
 
 215 See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (discussing the swap at issue in St. 
Matthew’s). 
 216 The interpretive guidance proposed by the CFTC and the SEC confirms that 
the Ciaola and Rorech swaps would have been security-based swaps.  The equity swaps 
in Ciaola were total return swaps.  See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based 
Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap 
Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29818, 29842 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240) (defining a total return swap as one “in which 
one counterparty . . . makes a payment that is based on the price appreciation and 
income from an underlying security . . . [and t]he other counterparty . . . makes a 
financing payment . . ., as well as a payment based on the price depreciation of the 
[security]”); Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 618 n.88 (“An equity swap is a total return swap referencing an 
equity security or a basket of securities.”).  According to the CFTC and the SEC, 
“where a [total return swap] is based on a single security . . . , the [total return swap] 
is a security-based swap.”  Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and 
“Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement 
Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. at 29842.  The guidance similarly provides that a credit 
default swap, like the one in Rorech, that is “triggered by a [financial] event relating 
to the issuer . . . [is] a security-based swap.”  Id. at 29843.   
 217 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(68) (West 2011). 
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The meaning of “based on” is an open question under Dodd-
Frank, but the reform Act’s amendments to CEA section 4a(a) under 
section 737, its treatment of so-called “mixed swaps,”
218
 and the inter-
pretive guidance proposed by the CFTC and the SEC provide some 
insight as to the term.  The use of the phrase “directly based on”
219
 in 
amended CEA section 4a(a)(4)(B) and the absence of the word “di-
rectly” from the definition of “security-based swap” suggest a some-
what flexible interpretation of the term “based on” in the definition 
of “security-based swap.”   Moreover, the inclusion of mixed swaps in 
the definition indicates that “based on” does not require an exclusive 
relationship.  On the other hand, the proposed interpretative guid-
ance indicates that not just any relationship will suffice.  The mere 
fact that a term of an instrument is “informed by [a] value or level of 
a security, rate, or other commodity at the time of the execution” 
does not mean that the instrument is a security-based swap.
220
  Con-
sidering these points, perhaps Rorech’s interpretation of “based on”—
as requiring a relationship between two items in which one is a “fun-
damental part or ingredient of, or principal component of” the oth-
er—may apply equally to the definition of “security-based swap.”
221
 
The equity swaps in Caiola easily satisfy the definition of security-
based swap.  They related to a single security—Philip Morris stock—
and were the functional equivalent of trading in the security.  With 
equity swaps specifically listed in the definition of “swap” under CEA 
section 1a(47), the Caiola equity swaps would have been swaps.  In 
addition, because the Caiola equity swaps were related exclusively to 
Philip Morris stock, they would be considered “based on” a single securi-
ty under any interpretation of the phrase. 
The CDSs at issue in Rorech also satisfy the definition of security-
based swap.  Like equity swaps, CDSs specifically are listed in the CEA 
“swap” definition.  Therefore, the Rorech CDSs would have been 
swaps.  Moreover, payments under the Rorech swaps were triggered on 
the occurrence of a credit event (which certainly would have been a 
financial event under the definition of “security-based swap”) relating 
to VNU, a single issuer of bonds, which are securities. 
 
 218 See supra note 199 and accompanying text (indicating that instruments that 
have attributes of both a swap and a security-based swap are treated as both). 
 219 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 737(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 1724 (to be cod-
ified at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(4)(B)) (emphasis added). 
 220 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 29845.  
 221 SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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As discussed in Part II.B.3, the swaps at issue in Elliott, Wyly, and 
Goldman Sachs likely satisfied the pre-Dodd-Frank definition of “secu-
rity-based swap agreement” for the same reasons that the swaps in 
Caiola and Rorech did.
222
  Because those cases are short on details re-
garding the mechanics of the swaps at issue, it is difficult to analyze 
with specificity whether those swaps would meet the definition of “se-
curity-based swap” and therefore be excluded from the definition of 
“security-based swap agreement” post-Dodd-Frank.  Nevertheless, giv-
en the apparent similarity of the swaps in Elliott and Wyly to those in 
Caiola and the apparent similarity of the CDSs in Goldman Sachs to the 
CDSs in Rorech, it seems likely that the swaps in Elliott, Wyly, and Gold-
man Sachs similarly would be security-based swaps and thus not securi-
ty-based swap agreements post-Dodd-Frank. 
The only other cases dealing with over-the-counter derivatives 
that met or were alleged to have met the pre-Dodd-Frank definition 
of “security-based swap agreement” were those in School District of Erie, 
Langford, and LeCroy, and it is uncertain whether the swaps at issue in 
those cases would meet the post-Dodd-Frank definition.  What is cer-
tain is that the School District of Erie swaption would not be a security-
based swap; therefore, it would not be excluded from the post-Dodd-
Frank definition of “security-based swap agreement” for that reason.  
Although the School District of Erie swaption is not clearly outside the 
statutory definition of “security-based swap,” the interpretive guid-
ance proposed by the CFTC and the SEC confirms that it is in fact 
excluded.  The guidance states that interest rate swaps based solely 
on LIBOR are not security-based swaps.
223
  Moreover, the guidance 
makes clear that the mere fact that the fixed rate in the School District 
of Erie swaption was determined in reference to the related bonds 
would not be sufficient to make the swaption a security-based swap.
224
 
Whether the SIFMA Index swaps in Langford and LeCroy would 
be security-based swaps, and therefore excluded from the post-Dodd-
Frank definition of “security-based swap agreement,” is less clear.  
The definition of “security-based swap” in Exchange Act section 
3(a)(68) provides that the term “index” means “an index or group of 
 
 222 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs). 
 223 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 29840. 
 224 See id. at 29845 (stating that the fact that a term of a swap is “informed by the 
value or level of a security, rate, or other commodity at the time of execution” does 
not itself determine whether the instrument is a swap or security-based swap, “pro-
vided that the . . . term . . . is set at the time of execution . . . and the value or level of 
that fixed term or condition may not vary over the life of the [instrument.]”).  
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securities.”
225
  Thus, if the group of VRDOs used to calculate the 
SIFMA Index is a narrow-based security index and if the SIFMA Index 
represents an interest in that group or the value of that group for pur-
poses of the definition of “security-based swap,” a SIFMA Index swap 
might be included.
226
 
The term “narrow-based security index” was defined by the 
CFMA in connection with permitting the trading of securities futures 
in the United States.
227
  Several years after the CFMA was enacted, the 
SEC and the CFTC noted that “most indexes composed of debt secu-
rities . . . would fall within the statutory definition.”
228
  Considering 
this generally inappropriate, the SEC and CFTC adopted Rule 3a55-2 
under the Exchange Act to exclude certain debt indexes from the 
definition.
229
  Under the proposed rules issued by the SEC and the 
CFTC pursuant to Dodd-Frank, Rule 3a55-2 would apply to the defi-
nition of “security-based swap” to the same extent as it applies to the 
definition of “security future.”
230
  Without knowing the make-up of 
the group of over 600 securities used to calculate the SIFMA Index 
and because the group changes from week to week, it is hard even to 
speculate whether a particular group would fit within the statutory 
definition of “narrow-based security index” or qualify for the exclu-
sion under Rule 3a55-2. 
 
 225 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(68)(E) (West 2011) (emphasis added).  The term gener-
ally excludes a swap that would be a security-based swap by virtue of being based on 
an exempted security, but it includes one that is based on a municipal security.  Id. § 
78c(a)(68)(C).  The exclusion uses the definitions of “exempted security” and “mu-
nicipal security” that were in effect when the Futures Trading Act of 1982 was enact-
ed.  Id. 
 226 In light of the fact that the SIFMA Index is calculated based on a single attrib-
ute of the underlying group of securities, an argument that a SIFMA Index swap is 
based on the underlying group of securities (rather than an interest in or the value 
of the group) is not viable.  
 227 See Edward J. Rosen & Geoffrey B. Goldman, The Commodity Futures Moderniza-
tion Act of 2000, in SWAPS & OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 2001, at 573, 579 (PLI Corp. & 
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1280 2001) (noting that the CFMA permit-
ted trading in futures on narrow-based securities indexes).   
 228 Joint Final Rules: Application of Narrow-Based Security Index to Debt Security 
Indexes and Security Futures on Debt Securities, 71 Fed. Reg. 39534, 39534 (July 13, 
2006) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).   
 229 17 C.F.R. 240.3a55-2 (2011). 
 230 See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based 
Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 
Fed. Reg. 29818, 29896 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 1, 
240) (providing that, under Proposed Rule 240.3a68-3(a), the rules and regulations 
interpreting the term “narrow-based security index” generally apply to the definition 
of “security-based swap” to the same extent as they apply to the definition of “security 
future”). 
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Whether a SIFMA Index swap would be considered based on an 
interest in the underlying group or the value of the underlying group 
is a difficult question.  Unlike the definition of “security-based swap 
agreement,” the term “value” in the definition of “security-based 
swap” refers only to a security or group of securities as a whole, rather 
than to an interest in a security or group of securities.  An interest rate 
clearly does not represent the value of all of the interests in a security 
or group of securities, so a SIFMA Index swap should not be a securi-
ty-based swap for that reason.  Whether a SIFMA Index swap might be 
considered based on an interest in the underlying group of securities 
is anyone’s guess. 
Mention of the SIFMA Index is notably absent from the inter-
pretive guidance and rules proposed by the CFTC and the SEC.  The 
guidance states that when an instrument is “based solely on levels of 
interest rates or other monetary rates that are not themselves based 
on one or more securities, the instrument would be a swap and not a 
security-based swap.”
231
  It states elsewhere that “if [an] interest rate 
swap contain[s] additional terms that [are] in fact contingent on a 
characteristic of [a] debt security, such as an adjustment to future in-
terest rate swap payments based on the future price or yield of the 
debt security, [the instrument] would be a security-based swap.”
232
  
Unfortunately, the “guidance” leaves open questions as to whether 
the group of securities used to calculate the SIFMA Index constitutes 
a narrow-based security index and, if it does, whether a SIFMA Index 
swap is based on that group or an interest in that group. 
2. The Security-Based Swap Definition Allows Appropriate 
Allocation of Jurisdiction 
The cases involving alleged security-based swap agreements have 
been at two extremes—those in which SEC jurisdiction is clearly ap-
propriate and those in which SEC jurisdiction is clearly unnecessary.  
The definition of “security-based swap agreement” at worst results in, 
and at best leaves uncertain the question of, SEC jurisdiction in cases 
where such jurisdiction is clearly unnecessary.  The definition of “se-
curity-based swap,” when coupled with the interpretive guidance pro-
posed by the CFTC and the SEC, appears to strike a better balance. 
As discussed above, if Dodd-Frank had been in effect when the 
swaps at issue in Caiola, Rorech, Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs were 
entered into, the swaps in Caiola and Rorech would have been, and the 
 
 231 Id. at 29840.   
 232 Id. at 29845.   
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ones in Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs likely would have been, securi-
ty-based swaps and therefore subject to SEC jurisdiction.  Such a re-
sult is appropriate because the types of swaps at issue in those cases 
present securities-like fraud risks.  This is particularly true as to the 
type of swaps at issue in Caiola, Elliott, and Wyly, which can serve as 
substitutes for trading in securities.
233
 
Similarly, the cost-of-funds swap described in Part III.C,
234
 which 
also presents securities-like fraud risks, would be a security-based swap 
and subject to SEC antifraud jurisdiction.  Interest rate swaps are spe-
cifically listed in the definition of “swap” under CEA section 1a(47), 
the swap clearly is connected to a single security—the related bonds—
and although the meaning of “based on” is not entirely clear, the in-
terpretive guidance specifically states that “if [an] interest rate swap 
contain[s] . . . terms that are . . . contingent on a characteristic of 
debt security that may change in the future, . . . then [the instru-
ment] would be a security-based swap.”
235
 
Unlike the swaps at issue in Caiola, Rorech, Elliott, Wyly, and Gold-
man Sachs and the cost-of-funds swap described in Part III.C, the 
swaps at issue in St. Matthew’s, School District of Erie, Langford, and 
LeCroy should not be subject to SEC antifraud jurisdiction because 
they do not represent securities-like fraud risks.  As discussed earlier, 
it is clear that the School District of Erie swaption would escape the def-
inition of “security-based swap.”  For the same reasons, the St. Mat-
thew’s swap would as well.  Unfortunately, that result is not certain 
with respect to the SIFMA Index swaps at issue in Langford and LeCroy.  
Nevertheless, it seems more difficult to argue that those swaps satisfy 
the definition of security-based swap than it is to argue that they are 
security-based swap agreements.  As discussed in Part III.C, one can 
make a reasonable argument that the SIFMA Index swaps were secu-
rity-based swap agreements because the SIFMA Index is determined 
from interest rates that are set based on the prices of the underlying 
securities (i.e., the VRDOs).  In contrast, even assuming that the 
 
 233 See SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“CDSs that refer-
ence single corporate entities are viewed by market participants as synthetic bond 
positions in those entities, with the purchase of CDS protection being the equivalent 
of shorting a corporate bond, and the selling of protection being the equivalent of 
buying a bond.”); Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (describing how an equity swap replicates the economics of purchasing a secu-
rity).  
 234 See supra Part III.C (describing an example of a “cost-of-funds” swap). 
 235 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 29840. 
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group of securities used to calculate the SIFMA Index constitutes a 
narrow-based security index, it would take some mental gymnastics to 
conclude that the SIFMA Index’s composite interest rate represents 
an interest in that group of underlying securities. 
Based on the pre-Dodd-Frank cases that involved alleged securi-
ty-based swap agreements, allocating antifraud jurisdiction to the SEC 
using the term “security-based swap” appears to strike a better (or at 
least a marginally clearer) balance than the term “security-based swap 
agreement” achieved before the reform act.  The swaps at issue in 
those pre-Dodd-Frank cases that raised securities-like fraud concerns 
would be security-based swaps subject to broad SEC jurisdiction post-
Dodd-Frank, and the swaps that did not raise those concerns likely 
would be swaps subject to broad CFTC jurisdiction. 
3. The Term Has Been Poorly Interpreted 
As discussed in Part II.C of this Article, the term “security-based 
swap agreement” has been poorly interpreted.  The St. Matthew’s 
court reached a sweeping conclusion that LIBOR swaps cannot be 
“security-based swap agreements” and failed to give appropriate at-
tention to the connection between the swap at issue in the case and 
the related loan agreement.  School District of Erie followed suit and vir-
tually ignored the fact that the LIBOR-based swaption at issue in that 
case had a fixed rate that very likely was determined using the interest 
rates for related bonds.  As a result, School District of Erie never ad-
dressed the consequence of having a swap rate equal to an interest 
rate of a debt security.  Because the connection between the swaps 
and the related loan and bonds in St. Matthew’s and School District of 
Erie did not present securities-type fraud risks with respect to the 
swaps, the courts in those cases reached appropriate conclusions 
from a policy perspective.  Their cursory analyses, however, bode ill 
for the future.  After St. Matthew’s was decided, the courts in School 
District of Erie and Rorech mindlessly repeated the conclusion that 
LIBOR-based swaps cannot be security-based swap agreements.  If the 
court in St. Matthew’s appropriately had based its holding on the fact 
that the loan agreement related to the swap was not a security, the 
court in School District of  Erie might have given more studied attention 
to the fact that the School District of Erie swaption indeed had a con-
nection to a security. 
In their recent proposed interpretive guidance, the CFTC and 
the SEC made clear that the fact that a “fixed term[] or condition[] 
of [an instrument has been] informed by the value or level of a secu-
rity, rate, or other commodity at the time of execution of the instru-
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ment” should not have an impact on whether an instrument is a swap 
or a security-based swap as long as “the fixed term or condition is set at 
the time of execution . . . and the value or level of that fixed term 
may not vary over the life of the [instrument].”
236
  Consequently, as 
indicated above, the swaption in School District of  Erie would not be a 
security-based swap even though the fixed rate in the swaption likely 
was determined by reference to interest rates for the related bonds.
237
  
Unfortunately, the commissions provided no similar guidance with 
respect to security-based swap agreements, leaving the School District of Erie 
conclusion that the swaption was not a security-based swap agreement 
open to dispute. 
4. The Term Is Overly Broad 
The fact that one reasonably could conclude that the plain 
meaning of the term “security-based swap agreement” includes a 
SIFMA Index swap suggests that the term is overly broad.
238
  As dis-
cussed earlier, a SIFMA Index swap does not pose the risks normally 
associated with securities and therefore does not warrant coverage 
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
239
 
Sadly, it appears that the SEC and the CFTC have not corrected 
the overreaching application of the term “security-based swap agree-
ment” to SIFMA Index swaps in their proposed rulemaking.  In their 
proposed interpretative guidance, the commissions stated that “a 
swap based on certain . . . exempted securities other than municipal 
securities” clearly is a security-based swap agreement.
240
  Although this 
might be read to imply that a swap based on a municipal security 
(which would include the VRDOs used for the SIFMA Index)
241
 is not 
a security-based swap agreement, the fact that a swap based on ex-
 
 236 See id. at 29818 (proposing interpretive guidance and rules regarding the terms 
“swap,” “security-based swap,” and “security-based swap agreement”). 
 237 See id. at 29840 (providing that swaps based solely on LIBOR are not security-
based swaps). 
 238 See supra Part III.C (discussing arguments that a SIFMA Index swap is a securi-
ty-based swap agreement). 
 239 See supra Part III.C (indicating that SIFMA Index swaps ought not be subject to 
the provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act with respect to security-
based swap agreements). 
 240 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 29863.   
 241 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (2006) (defining the term “municipal securities”); 
supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting SIFMA’s assertion that municipal 
bonds are used for the SIFMA Index because they are the only instruments with tax-
exempt rates). 
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empted securities other than municipal securities definitively is a secu-
rity-based swap agreement does not necessarily mean that one based 
on municipal securities is not.  The fact that the commissions left this 
question open is not surprising.  Both Langford and LeCroy were still 
pending when the proposed guidance and rules were published, and 
it is extremely unlikely that the SEC would propose or adopt a rule 
that might compromise its litigation position.  Langford has already 
been decided, but even if the litigation in LeCroy concludes by the 
time the final rules are adopted, it seems doubtful that the SEC will 
adopt a rule contrary to its position in those cases. 
Fortunately, Dodd-Frank may have given a measure of relief 
from rigid interpretations of the term “security-based swap agree-
ment.”  Although seemingly insignificant, Dodd-Frank’s movement of 
the definition from GLBA section 206B to Exchange Act section 3(a) 
may allow for a more flexible interpretation of the term.  The intro-
ductory language preceding all of the definitions under Exchange 
Act section 3(a) states “unless the context otherwise requires.”
242
  No 
similar language applies to GLBA section 206B.  Arguably, Exchange 
Act section 3(a)’s introductory language gives courts room to apply 
policy-based reasoning in interpreting Exchange Act definitions.  Un-
like the court in LeCroy, then, a court considering a SIFMA Index 
swap under the post-Dodd Frank definition of “security-based swap 
agreement” seems to have the flexibility to determine that, notwith-
standing the fact that the swap satisfies a strict interpretation of the 
definitional text, the swap in fact does not satisfy the definition be-
cause its connection to a security is inconsequential for antifraud 
purposes. 
5. The Concept Is Redundant 
The CFMA created a federal regulatory void, one in which most 
over-the-counter derivatives were not subject to the provisions of ei-
ther the federal securities laws or commodities laws.
243
  In order to 
 
 242 § 78c(a).  
 243 See id. § 77b-1(a) (providing that non-security-based swap agreements were not 
securities); id. 78c-1(a)  (same).  The CFMA added two provisions to the CEA that 
were intended to—and clearly did—exclude most swaps from the CEA.  Section 
2(d)(1) of the CEA excluded from most provisions of the Act, any agreement, con-
tract, or transaction in an excluded commodity if the agreement, contract, or trans-
action is entered into only between persons that are eligible contract participants 
and is not executed or traded on a trading facility.  7 U.S.C. § 2(d)(1) (2006).  Sec-
tion 2(g) similarly excluded from most provisions of the CEA any agreement, con-
tract, or transaction in a commodity other than an agricultural commodity if the 
agreement is entered into only between persons that are eligible contract partici-
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make sure that appropriate antifraud enforcement would be available 
in circumstances related to securities, it made sense for Congress to 
cast a wide net with the term “security-based swap agreement” and 
capture some transactions that really are not significant to the securi-
ties markets.  In the context of Dodd-Frank’s sweeping regulation of 
the over-the-counter derivatives market, however, such overly broad 
SEC antifraud jurisdiction is no longer necessary.  After Dodd-Frank, 
there is no federal regulatory void.  By dividing the world of over-the-
counter derivatives into swaps and security-based swaps, Congress 
made sure that the CFTC’s jurisdiction picks up where the SEC’s ju-
risdiction leaves off. 
In Dodd-Frank, Congress amended CEA section 6(c) to prohibit, 
“in connection with any swap, . . . any manipulative or deceptive de-
vice or contrivance . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the [CFTC] shall promulgate.”
244
  Because of the similarity between 
the language in CEA section 6(c) and that in Exchange Act section 
10(b), the CFTC has adopted a rule “model[ed] . . . on SEC Rule 
10b-5.”
245
  Moreover, Congress’s amendment of CEA section 22(a)(1) 
grants a private cause of action with respect to swaps.
246
  With Dodd-
Frank’s changes to the CEA and the CFTC’s new rule, security-based 
swap agreements are subject to the antifraud jurisdiction of two fed-
eral agencies and private litigants have very similar recourse under 
both the CEA and the Exchange Act.  The continuing application of 
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to security-based swap 
agreements, therefore, leaves a redundancy. 
The proposed guidance and rules published by the SEC and the 
CFTC seem to indicate that even the commissions themselves have 
found that the “security-based swap agreement” concept is redun-
dant.  The two commissions declined Congress’s invitation to adopt 
rules governing books and records for security-based swap agree-
ments and asserted that the CFTC’s rules governing swaps generally 
are sufficient for security-based swap agreements.
247
  Furthermore, out 
 
pants, is subject to individual negotiation and is not executed on a trading facility.  
Id. § 2(g). 
 244 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 753(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1750 (2010) (to 
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9(c)(1)). 
 245 Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative 
and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition of Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 
41,399 (July 14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180). 
 246 Dodd-Frank Act § 753(c), 124 Stat. at 1754 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 
25(a)(1)(D)). 
 247 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. 
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of over eighty pages of proposed rules and interpretive guidance, the 
commissions devoted only two paragraphs to the definition of the 
term “security-based swap agreement,” and they indicated that they 
had received no comments with respect to the definition of the term 
and had not “been made aware of any significant market confusion 
over what constitutes a [security-based swap agreement].”
248
  The lack 
of commentary indicates that market participants do not care.  Post-
Dodd-Frank, virtually all over-the-counter derivatives are subject to 
broad federal antifraud statutes.  It is no longer a question of whether 
there is antifraud jurisdiction.  It is now a question of who has it. 
6. The Term Creates Confusion 
Although it certainly is not the most important reason to elimi-
nate the “security-based swap agreement” concept from the Securities 
Act and the Exchange Act, having both “security-based swaps” and 
“security-based swap agreements” in the same regulatory regime creates 
the potential for confusion.  If Congress wanted to retain the term 
“security-based swap agreement,” it should have been more creative 
in the names it gave in Dodd-Frank to the over-the-counter deriva-
tives subject to broad SEC jurisdiction and those subject to broad 
CFTC jurisdiction.  A footnote in the District Court’s opinion in El-
liott may be a preview of the confusion that could be forthcoming.  In 
that case, the court suggested that the reform broadened the mean-
ing of “security-based swap.” 
249
  Dodd-Frank, of course, did no such 
thing.  The term “security-based swap” is a new term, and the term 
“security-based swap agreement” was narrowed in the reform. 
Much needs to be done to understand the scope of the new reg-
ulatory scheme.  Notwithstanding the fact that the CFTC and the SEC 
did not receive comments on the definition of “security-based swap 
agreement,” the term has been a source of confusion in the past—as 
St. Matthew’s, School District of Erie, Langford, and LeCroy evidence.  Its 
continuing role alongside a new term with a substantially similar 
name only creates the possibility of more confusion. 
 
Reg. 29818, 29863 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240); 
see supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that, under Dodd-Frank, a security-
based swap agreement is a type of “swap”). 
 248 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 29862–63.   
 249 See Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 475 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (referencing the financial reform and the term “security-based 
swap”). 
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B. A Beneficial Remnant of a Bygone Era? 
Perhaps Congress merely was being pragmatic in leaving the 
term “security-based swap agreement” and its associated provisions in 
place.  For over thirty years, the SEC and the CFTC have engaged in a 
turf war.
250
  In 1975, the SEC challenged the CFTC’s exclusive juris-
diction over futures contracts involving securities.
251
  In 1981, the SEC 
asserted exclusive jurisdiction over “options on securities traded on a 
national securities exchange” and provoked a lawsuit by the Chicago 
Board of Trade, which claimed the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction.
252
  
In 1982, the SEC and the CFTC resolved some jurisdictional disa-
greements through the Shad-Johnson Accord, which Congress subse-
quently enacted,
253
 but in the late 1980s, a jurisdictional dispute arose 
again over stock index participation instruments.
254
  Although the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit resolved the 
dispute in favor of exclusive CFTC jurisdiction and “concluded that 
the premise under the [Shad-Johnson Accord] was that if an instru-
ment can be classified as both a security and a futures contract, exclu-
sive jurisdiction lies with the CFTC,” jurisdictional disputes contin-
ued.
255
 
By keeping the security-based swap agreement concept in place 
and giving the SEC and the CFTC joint rulemaking authority to de-
fine it, Congress may have been trying to leave an easy venue for 
compromise and a solution that could mitigate jurisdictional dis-
putes.  Specifically, Congress may have intended that the two com-
missions include in the scope of the term “security-based swap 
agreement” derivatives with respect to which the commissions disa-
greed as to jurisdiction.  By doing so, those derivatives would be sub-
ject to the general jurisdiction of the CFTC and the SEC would have 
 
 250 See 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[8], [9], at 1000–11 (recounting 
the SEC’s challenges to the CFTC’s jurisdiction); Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC 
and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 552 (2009) (“The SEC and 
CFTC have a history of clashing over their respective jurisdictions, and their regula-
tory approaches are often sharply distinctive and incompatible.”). 
 251 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[8], at 1000. 
 252 Id. § 4.05[8], at 1000–01 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th 
Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982)). 
 253 Markham, supra note 250, at 569.  For the codification of the accord, see Fu-
tures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified in scattered 
sections of 7, 15, and 29 U.S.C.).   
 254 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[8], at 1008. 
 255 Id. § 4.05[8], at 1009 (quoting Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th 
Cir. 1989)). 
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concurrent antifraud jurisdiction.
256
  If this was Congress’s intent, 
however, the CFTC and the SEC have not used their rulemaking au-
thority in that way.
257
 
In addition, concurrent jurisdiction might be viewed as benefi-
cial in light of the different regulatory approaches taken by the SEC 
and the CFTC.  “[F]utures regulation has been preoccupied with the 
protection of the commercial uses and benefits of those markets, 
while securities regulation has focused primarily on protection for 
the investment-minded public.”
258
  These historical focuses suggest 
that the SEC may be more adept at antifraud enforcement than the 
CFTC and that therefore the market would benefit by the SEC’s re-
taining its antifraud jurisdiction over security-based swap agreements 
even though such jurisdiction would be concurrent with the CFTC’s 
broad jurisdiction over those instruments. 
Of course, the SEC has had this antifraud jurisdiction for over 
ten years and has used it only five times.  Even so, one might argue 
that there is no harm—and that there could be some benefit—in 
leaving the SEC with antifraud jurisdiction over security-based swap 
agreements.  Such jurisdiction certainly gives the SEC more latitude 
in its enforcement efforts, and having security-based swap agreements 
subject to the antifraud provisions of both the securities laws and the 
commodities laws might create a stronger deterrent effect.
259
 
On the other hand, giving overly broad and unnecessary juris-
diction to the SEC can stretch the SEC too thin.  It can result, for ex-
ample, in the SEC’s being slow to stop the mastermind of a multi-
billion dollar Ponzi scheme,
260
 while pursuing antifraud enforcement 
against a stockbroker who misappropriated a mere $343,000 of his 
 
 256 See supra Part IV (indicating that a security-based swap agreement is subject to 
SEC antifraud jurisdiction, but it also is a “swap,” which is subject to the general ju-
risdiction of the CFTC). 
 257 See supra note 210 and accompanying text (noting the limited attention that 
the CFTC and the SEC have given to the security-based swap agreements). 
 258 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[9], at 1011. 
 259 Indeed, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has suggested that, for some over-the-
counter derivatives, the SEC and the CFTC “will share jurisdiction”—that “[t]here 
will be two cops on the beat.”  Yin Wilczek, CFTC, SEC to Face Challenges in Defining 
Jurisdiction Over OTC Swaps, Gensler Says, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Nov. 15, 2010. 
 260 See Yin Wilczek & Phyllis Diamond, 2010 Will Be Important for SEC Enforcers as 
Division Continues to Rebuild Reputation, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Jan. 25, 2010 (noting that 
the SEC failed to uncover Bernard Madoff’s $50 billion Ponzi scheme); Cox Says Staff 
Saw Red Flags with Madoff But Failed to Alert Full Commission to Act, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, 
Dec. 17, 2008 (indicating that the SEC had received credible information about the 
Madoff scheme as early as 1999, but failed to act). 
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clients’ assets.
261
   This risk of misallocation of resources is particularly 
relevant when resources are limited.  With the House Appropriations 
Committee’s approving funding for the SEC in fiscal year 2012 equal 
to that in 2011 and over $220 million less than what the President re-
quested,
262
 the SEC needs to focus on smart regulation, not more 
regulation, and Congress needs to help the SEC do so. 
Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction leads to the risk that neither 
agency will take up enforcement with respect to wrongdoing or that 
they will duplicate their efforts.  In some situations, one agency may 
fail to act based on the assumption that the other will do so.  In oth-
ers, both agencies may act, which could result in wasteful duplication 
of efforts.  With mammoth deficits saddling the United States, regula-
tion needs to be efficient. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior to Dodd-Frank, over-the-counter derivatives were largely 
unregulated by the federal securities laws.  In general, the onerous 
registration and information-reporting requirements of the Securities 
Act and the Exchange Act did not apply to them, and only over-the-
counter derivatives that met the definition of “security-based swap 
agreement” were subject to the antifraud provisions of Securities Act 
section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Con-
gress changed all of that when it enacted Dodd-Frank.  With the re-
form Act, Congress put in place a new and extensive regulatory 
scheme for the over-the-counter derivatives market.  Rather than do-
ing away with the “security-based swap agreement” concept when it 
crafted Dodd-Frank, however, Congress incorporated it.  That was a 
mistake. 
The “security-based swap agreement” concept is fraught with 
problems.  Since 2000, when the concept first was introduced, the 
SEC has brought related enforcement actions only five times, and 
very few courts have considered the meaning of the term.  Unfortu-
nately, two courts have interpreted the term poorly, and there is a 
risk that those poor interpretations will be perpetuated.  In addition, 
the definition of the term “security-based swap agreement” is overly 
broad, arguably capturing swaps that do not raise securities-like fraud 
risks.  Moreover, retaining the concept in the Dodd-Frank scheme re-
 
 261 See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 (2002) (representing an enforcement 
action under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to the misap-
propriation by a stockbroker of $343,000 of his clients’ assets). 
 262 House Committee Passes Bill to Fund SEC, in FY 2012, at FY 2011 Levels, BNA SEC. 
L. DAILY (June 24, 2011).   
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sults in redundant antifraud jurisdiction that could prove costly and 
wasteful at a time when government resources are running thin.  Fi-
nally, the concept creates confusion in the already extremely com-
plex Dodd-Frank regulatory apparatus.   
When Congress enacted Dodd-Frank, it should have recognized 
these problems and erased the “security-based swap agreement” con-
cept from the federal securities laws.  The eraser is still handy.  It is 
time for Congress to use it. 
 
